Resume af kommentarer indkommet i den tekniske dialog afholdt i forbindelse med udbuddet af kystnære havvindmøller

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1 R ESUME AF T EKNISK DI AL O G S U M M AR Y OF TECHNI C AL D I AL OGUE P LE AS E FI N D ENG LISH VERSION BELOW 9. oktober 2014 J.nr. 1031/ Center for Energiressourcer Resume af kommentarer indkommet i den tekniske dialog afholdt i forbindelse med udbuddet af kystnære havvindmøller Energistyrelsen har afholdt en teknisk dialog med potentielle bydere på baggrund af et dialogpapir, et seminar samt en række individuelle møder. En bred vifte af markedets aktører har deltaget i dialogen på forskellige niveauer enten ved deltagelse på seminaret, med individuelle møder eller skriftlige svar eller en blanding af alle tilbud. Vækstaftalen blev færdigforhandlet d. 14. juli, mens den tekniske dialog pågik. Den tekniske dialog blev afsluttet den 4. august Vækstaftalen betød for de kystnære havvindmølleparker, at: Der indføres et prisloft for de kystnære møller, så der ved det aftalte udbud kun accepteres tilbud til en gennemsnitlig pris på maksimalt 70 øre pr. kwh (til fastholdte vilkår i forhold til tilskudsperiodens længde, ansvar for tilslutning osv.). Hvis der ikke er tilstrækkeligt med tilbud til at opstille 350 MW, kan bud, der medfører, at den gennemsnitlige pris bliver højere end 70 øre pr. kwh, kun accepteres ved enighed i energiforligskredsen. 1 Dette betyder, at udbuddet reduceres fra at være et udbud af 450 MW til at blive et udbud af 350 MW. Det er de samme områder, der udbydes, og der ændres ikke på, at der kan opføres op til 200 MW i hvert af de udbudte områder. Områderne konkurrerer stadig indbyrdes. Nedenfor gengives i summarisk form de vigtigste pointer fra dialogsvarene og herpå. Overordnet udbudsmodel Flere potentielle bydere stillede spørgsmålstegn ved, om det var nødvendigt at fastholde en maksimumsgrænse på 200 MW pr. område, da større parker er relativt billigere. Det blev kommunikeret klart og entydigt fra de potentielle bydere, at det ikke bør være muligt at placere flere parker indenfor samme område. Dette vil give komplikationer med skyggeeffekter, og der menes ikke i nogle af områderne at være plads til 2 parker. Der vil være konkrete fysiske udfordringer for koncessionshaverne i anlægsperioden, hvis to forskelligt ejede parker skal opføres samtidig. 1 Aftale om tilbagerulning af forsyningssikkerhedsafgiften mv. og lempelser af PSO indgået af Regeringen, Venstre, Dansk Folkeparti, Socialistisk Folkeparti og Enhedslisten d. 14 juli Side 1 af 14

2 Flere aktører foreslog at gennemføre en billiggørelse af projekterne ved at fjerne nettilslutningen fra projekterne. Det er ikke muligt at ændre på grænsen for projektstørrelsen til > 200 MW. Der har i hele planprocessen forud for udbuddet været lagt en maksimumgrænse på 200 MW til grund for hvert enkelt udbygningsområde, dvs. i den forudgående screening af områderne foretaget af havvindmølleudvalget og den tilhørende høring, den politiske clearing med kommunerne og i fastlæggelsen af rammerne for VVM-redegørelsen. Energistyrelsen forventer at kunne udelukke muligheden for, at der kan placeres flere parker i hvert område, med mindre parkerne er mindre end 50 MW stykket, og der er eksplicit enighed fra begge mulige koncessionshavere om, at dette er acceptabelt. Nettilslutningen vil forblive som en del af det udbudte projekt. Baggrunden for beslutningen om, at nettilslutningen er en del af projektet er, at havvindmølleparken og nettilslutningen udarbejdes samlet, og at valget af placering skal være samfundsøkonomisk optimal. Der foreligger ikke specifikationer på størrelsen af parkerne på de enkelte placeringer (dog maks. 200 MW), og det forventes heller ikke, at der vil blive bygget vindmølleparker på alle sites grundet det samlede udbuds størrelse og antallet af sites. Derved er det ikke muligt at spare tid eller penge ved at forberede nettilslutningen forud for projektet. Den mest optimale løsning er derfor, at koncessionshaver har ansvar for både havvindmøllepark og nettilslutning. Tidsplan Der er delte meninger om tidsplanen, men en overvægt af potentielle bydere mener ikke, at tidsplanen bør fastholdes for opførelsen af de kystnære parker samtidig med, at udbuddet påføres et stramt prisloft. Den generelle respons var, at med et stramt prisloft kan det være svært at sikre sig mod forsinkelser, da det er dyrt at have et beredskab til rådighed for alle hændelser. Desuden kan det være svært at finde de gode tilbud i underleverandørernes pipeline. Derudover anses det i lyset af erfaringerne fra processen om udbuddet af Horns Rev 3 for risikabelt, at tidsplanen op til afgivelse af bud er meget stram. Der efterlyses derfor en større fleksibilitet i tidsplanen. Det blev foreslået fra en potentiel byder at der gives mulighed for at afgive bud på det politisk fastsatte færdiggørelsestidspunkt og et senere færdiggørelsestidspunkt. Flere ønsker ½ års tidsforskydning mellem prækvalifikation og 1. foreløbige bud, samt ½ års forskydning mellem færdiggørelsen af VVM og 1. foreløbige bud. Desuden påpeges vigtigheden af, at tidsplanen fastholdes efter udmeldelsen. Da færdiggørelsestidspunktet for opførelsen af de kystnære havvindmølleparker er omfattet af energiforliget kan dette ikke ændres. Energistyrelsen undersøger andre måder at gøre tidsplanen mindre stram. Tidsmæssige krav vil blive stillet i det kommende udbudsmateriale. Energistyrelsen anerkender vigtigheden af at fastholde tidsplanen for udbudsprocessen undervejs. Side 2 af 14

3 Nettilslutning Der efterlyses oplysninger om, hvordan det nye nettilslutningsregime bliver udformet med revisionen af nettilslutningsbekendtgørelsen samt en plan for offentliggørelsen af dette. Aktører efterspørger bl.a. en større detaljeringsgrad i forhold til det kommende nettilslutningsregime med afklaring af, hvem der skal betale for hvad, hvem skal have anlægs- og driftsansvaret for hvilke dele af projektet, hvem bærer risikoen for nedbrud og nettab, osv. Desuden ønskes en afklaring af hvilken risiko og kompensation koncessionshaveren påføres i forhold til nedbrud i nettet på hhv. land og hav eller ved flaskehalse i det bagvedliggende net. Energistyrelsen arbejder i øjeblikket med revisionen af nettilslutningsbekendtgørelsen, som p.t. forventes at kunne komme i offentlig høring inden årets udgang. Energinet.dk s netanalyse offentliggøres, når der findes svar på de ovenstående spørgsmål, som har konsekvens for netanalysen. Energistyrelsen og Energinet.dk afholder efterfølgende sammen et seminar om disse emner. Energistyrelsen vil holde potentielle bydere opdateret via hjemmesiden. Prækvalifikationskriterier Markedet foreslår en række lempelser i den foreslåede model til prækvalifikation. De fleste af de potentielle bydere opfordrer til at mindske de økonomiske krav til at blive prækvalificeret og til de bøder og andre økonomiske krav, der stilles til byderne primært under anlægsfasen. Det blev foreslået fra flere sider, at der bliver lagt vægt på virksomhedernes rating eller soliditet frem for krav til omsætning. Ligeledes foreslog en enkelt virksomhed, at antal ansatte i virksomheden kunne stilles som krav i prækvalifikationen. Det blev foreslået, at de tekniske krav lempes således, at det ikke er et krav, at man in-house skal have den fornødne tekniske erfaring med at opstille møller på havet, men at dette krav kunne opfyldes via underleverandører eller erfaring med drift af landvindmøller. Inden offentliggørelsen af prækvalifikationskriterierne vil Energistyrelsen finde et passende niveau for prækvalifikation, som sikrer både at et bredt spektrum af aktører og konsortier kan prækvalificeres samt, at de prækvalificerede skal have den fornødne tekniske og finansielle kapacitet til at kunne gennemføre projekterne. Den finansielle prækvalifikation vil sandsynligvis tage udgangspunkt i soliditet eller rating og et omsætningskrav. Resultatet af disse overvejelser vil blive offentliggjort i prækvalifikationskravene i udbudsbekendtgørelsen. I disse overvejelser vil indgå hensynet til, at ansøger skal kunne matche den forventede investering. Energistyrelsen vil fastholde, at der bliver stillet krav om, at en koncessionshaver skal råde over tidsvarende erfaring med opstilling af vindmølleparker på havet. Energistyrelsen vil arbejde med om denne erfaring eventuelt kan komme som eksempelvis bindende kontrakter med underleverandører eller lignende. Side 3 af 14

4 Tildelingskriterium Energistyrelsen har lagt op til, at buddet afgives som laveste pris pr. kwh i de første fuldlasttimer, dvs. samme model som tidligere udbudsparker. Der er ikke enighed i markedet omkring hvilken afregningsperiode, der foretrækkes. Dele af markedet foretrækker i stedet for en model, hvor afregningen foregår over en længere periode, og der er fremkommet forskellige forslag til, hvordan dette kunne gøres. Andre foreslog, at der gives mulighed for at kunne modtage tilskuddet over en kortere tidsperiode. Der er generel opbakning til, at Energistyrelsen benytter betinget bud som del af tildelingsproceduren. Dette betyder, at man kan byde på både en enkelt park og/eller på samtlige 350 MW til en lavere pris. Dette vil bibringe udbuddet en mulighed for at skabe større skala i anlægsfasen og dermed drive priserne ned. Dog er det ikke anbefalet at fordoble omsætningskravet ved prækvalifikation, hvis man ønsker at afgive et betinget bud på 350 MW, da dette vil udelukke de fleste bydere. Der opfordres til, at Energistyrelsen beskriver, hvordan der prioriteres mellem budene, hvis der indkommer flere bud med samme pris, således at den samlede indbudte mængde overskrider de 350 MW. Flere bydere har foreslået, at lokalt ejerskab eller lokalt engagement bliver inddraget i tildelingskriteriet eller som krav i koncessionen som helhed. Miljømæssige forhold foreslås også inddraget. Eksempelvis blev alternative modeller for samfundsøkonomiske vurderinger med fokus på lokale værdier foreslået, ligesom hensyn til effektiv arealudnyttelse blev forslået som havende indflydelse. Det er blevet foreslået, at der lægges et lavere loft end 150 timer over hvor mange timer med elmarkedspris, der er lig nul eller negativ, der ikke bliver givet pristillæg i. Energistyrelsen vil arbejde med en tildeling, hvor der er klarhed over, hvordan Energistyrelsen mest samfundsøkonomisk optimalt sikrer, at der opføres 350 MW på baggrund af de indkomne bud. Tilbud kan kun accepteres til en pris, som leder til, at den gennemsnitlige pris for den samlede udbygning på 350 MW ligger på maksimalt 70 øre pr. kwh. Bud over dette niveau skal godkendes i forligskredsen. Helt centralt for det endelige valg af tildelingskriterium er, at det skal være gennemsigtigt, stille alle bydere lige, og at byderne på forhånd har fuld information om kriterierne. Tildelingskriteriet vil blive offentliggjort med udbudsbekendtgørelsen. På baggrund af vækstaftalen arbejder Energistyrelsen videre med, at støtten til havvindmølleparkerne gives pr. kwh i de første fuldlasttimer. I udbudsbetingelserne forventer Energistyrelsen at fastholde kravet om, at der ikke udbetales tilskud i de første 150 timer, hvor markedsprisen er lig nul eller negativ. Det er vigtigt for stabiliteten i elmarkedet og elnettet, at havvindmølleparkerne delvist er udsat for markedets signaler og på den måde kan deltage positivt i at opretholde stabiliteten. Energistyrelsen forventer at kunne give mulighed for at afgive betinget bud. Dette betyder, at man får mulighed for at byde ind på en enkelt park på én enkelt placering til én pris og/eller at byde ind med en lavere pris, som er betinget af, at man får koncession til opførelse af den samlede udbygning med 350 MW i f.eks. 2 områder. Side 4 af 14

5 Energistyrelsen vil ikke benytte incitamenter for god arealudnyttelse eller andre lokale miljøforhold i vurderingen af budene, da det med VVM-redegørelsen vurderes, hvilke vilkår der skal følges for, at projektet holdes inden for rammerne af det miljømæssigt acceptable. Koncessionshaveren får et begrænset areal til rådighed, men til gengæld har koncessionshaveren mulighed for at optimere sin park inden for dette område ud fra vilkårene i etableringstilladelsen. Det er generelt ikke muligt at lægge vægt på lokalt ejerskab som en del af tildelingen af projekter i EU-udbud. EUs indre markedsregler tillader ikke en sådan procedure, da den ikke stiller alle aktører lige og anses som værende diskriminerende og konkurrenceforvridende. Desuden tilgodeses lokalt ejerskab via køberetten og incitamentsordningen. Finansielle vilkår i driftsperioden Potentielle bydere viste generelt kun ringe interesse i incitamentet til øget lokalt ejerskab, som kan lede til et yderligere tillæg på 1 øre/kwh oveni afregningsprisen. Dog har der været forslag til, at 1- øren kunne udløses allerede ved 20 % lokalt ejerskab, ligesom det er blevet forslået, at en eventuel 1-øre kun skulle tilfalde lokale andelshavere. Energistyrelsen vurderer, at en favorisering af lokale andelshavere, således at kun de lokale får udbetalt den ekstra afregning og ikke alle ejere af projektet, vil være i strid med EU s regler om, at alle skal stilles lige i et udbud. Desuden vil dette fjerne incitamentet for en ikke-lokal byder til at arbejde for at få større lokalt ejerskab. Fastholdelsesbod, færdiggørelsesbod og nedtagelsesgaranti Der var generelt forståelse for, at en fastholdelsesbod er nødvendig, da der skal være fokus på, at projektet igangsættes, og på at tiltrække seriøse bydere, som er i stand til dette. Det blev påpeget fra flere sider, at en bankgaranti er dyrere end en moderselskabsgaranti, hvorfor der opfordres til kun at stille krav om moderselskabsgarantier. Argumentet er, at dette bør anses for tilstrækkeligt, da virksomheden allerede er blevet prækvalificeret og fundet tilstrækkelig solid. Der var forståelse i markedet for, at Energistyrelsen kræver en milepælsplan for projektet. Det blev pointeret, at når projektet først er i gang, vil en koncessionshaver have stort incitament til at gennemføre projektet uagtet en færdiggørelsesbod. Derfor var der ikke forståelse for, at forsinket færdiggørelse straffes med skrappe sanktioner. Der er fra flere sider stillet forslag om, at sanktioner erstattes med et incitament til hurtig færdiggørelse. Der blev stillet forslag om, at nedtagelsesgarantien skal stilles endnu længere ude i fremtiden end efter 12 år. Derudover burde garantien ifølge forslaget indfases gradvist. Energistyrelsen vil undersøge konsekvenserne af mere lempelige krav til fastholdelse- og færdiggørelsesboder, og hvordan et regime af incitamenter til igangsættelse og færdiggørelse kan udformes i lyset af de indkomne argumenter. Side 5 af 14

6 Energistyrelsen vil granske konsekvenserne for at benytte moderselskabsgarantier frem for bankgarantier. Energistyrelsen kan ikke give et incitament i form af ekstra støtte ved hurtig færdiggørelse, da dette ville betyde at PSO-udgifterne kunne stige hurtigere i perioden før 2020 end forventet i forbindelse med vækstaftalen. Nedtagelsesgarantien vil sandsynligvis blive fastholdt til at skulle stilles efter 12 år. De endelige krav vil blive offentliggjort i udbudsmaterialet. Køberetsordning Dele af markedet vil gerne have køberetsordningen aflyst. Bekymringen går på ekstra administration, involvering af uprofessionelle borgere, mangel på forståelse fra udenlandske investorer, m.m. Mange har dog sympati for, at borgere i nærområdet deltager i ejerskabet af havvindmølleparkerne og anerkender, at ordningen kan skabe større forståelse for beliggenheden og nemmere vilkår i især driftsperioden. Flere potentielle bydere foreslår, at køberetsordningen i højere grad udformes som på land, hvor borgerne udskilles i et selvstændigt selskab med begrænset indflydelse på anlægsbeslutninger, eller at ordningen på anden vis modificeres, f.eks. ved at reducere kravet om udbud af 20 %. Det er ikke aktuelt at aflyse køberetsordningen, da dette element har været en forudsætning under hele det forudgående planarbejde og politiske proces omkring udbuddet af de kystnære havvindmøller. Det er heller ikke en mulighed at skille de lokale andelshavere ud i et selvstændigt selskab som på land, da dette vil påføre borgerne en uforholdsmæssig stor risiko og være svært administrerbart fra et tilsynssynspunkt. Derudover vil køberetsselskabet ikke kunne opfylde de tekniske og finansielle krav, der stilles for at få en elproduktionsbevilling. Energistyrelsen undersøger, om der er andre muligheder for, at tilpasse køberetsordningen efter potentielle byderes input. Eventuelle justeringer vil blive kommunikeret via hjemmesiden, skulle de opstå. Værditabsordningen Der er i den tekniske dialog fremkommet forskellige forslag til at nedsætte koncessionshavernes risici ved værditabsordningen. Et forslag har gået på, at hele beløbet betales af staten, mens andre har ønsket, at der lægges et loft over, hvor meget en koncessionshaver kan komme til at bekoste på denne ordning. Ordningen har ikke været prøvet på havet før, hvilket stiller bydere overfor en delvist ukendt risiko. Det er fra flere sider foreslået at løfte en del af risikoen over på elforbrugerne eller skatteyderne ved hjælp af et prisloft over risikoen for koncessionshaverne på x mio. Det skal forstås således, at et samlet værditab som følge af hver park på over x mio. kr. skulle bæres af elforbrugerne/skatteyderne. Det er ikke aktuelt at afskaffe værditabsordningen, hvis formål er at beskytte borgere, som bor tæt på de kystnære havvindmølleparker og sikre, at koncessionshaverne tager mest mulig hensyn til naboerne. Side 6 af 14

7 Vurderingen er desuden, at et loft på den maksimale værditabsbetaling for det enkelte site ikke er en politisk gangbar løsning. Energistyrelsen vil stille mere informationen om værditabsordningen til rådighed for byderne. Dette kunne f.eks. omfatte erfaringerne på land og Taksationsmyndighedens hidtidige praksis. Mulighed for forsøgselement i parken Langt størstedelen af markedet har udtrykt, at de ikke ser en pris- og konkurrencebaseret udbudsform som kompatibel med at teste nye elementer. Test kræver tid og fleksibilitet og koster ekstra. Testelementer vil således ikke kunne indgå i et almindeligt prisbaseret udbud, uden at testelementet på en eller anden måde holdes uden for priskonkurrencen. Energistyrelsen vil ikke arbejde yderligere på at fremme mulighederne for test i parkerne. Hvis en koncessionshaver vælger at teste elementer i sin vindmøllepark, skal det derfor kunne holdes inden for de rammer, der udstikkes i etableringstilladelsen. Side 7 af 14

8 S U M M AR Y OF TECHNI C AL D I AL OGUE Summary of comments from the technical dialogue in connection with tendering procedures for wind turbines in nearshore areas The Danish Energy Agency has hosted the technical dialogue on the basis of a discussion paper, a seminar and a series of individual meetings. A broad range of market actors participated in the dialogue at various levels, either through participation in the seminar, written responses, individual meetings, or through a mix of these. The Growth Agreement was finally agreed on 14 July 2014, while the technical dialogue was still underway. The technical dialogue ended on 4 August The Growth Agreement entailed the following for the nearshore wind farms: "There will be a price cap for the nearshore wind turbines, so that only those tenders that have an average price of no more than DKK 0.7 per kwh (at the same terms and conditions for the duration of the subsidy period, with responsibility for connection to the grid, etc.) will be accepted in connection with the agreed tendering procedure. If there are not enough tenders for the establishment of 350MW, tenders which entail an average price of more than DKK 0.7 per kwh may be accepted, although only if all of the parties to the Energy Agreement so agree."2 This means that the 450MW originally put up for tender are reduced to 350MW. The same areas are being put up for tender, and the terms of the tender still allow for the establishment of turbines totalling 200MW in each of the areas subject to tender. There is still mutual competition between the areas. Below is a summary overview of the central points of the dialogue responses as well as the Danish Energy Agency's reply to these. Overall tendering model Several potential tenderers questioned the necessity of keeping a maximum limit of 200MW per area, when larger farms are relatively cheaper. The potential tenderers clearly and unequivocally noted that it should not be possible to place several farms inside the same area. This will lead to complications with regard to wake effects, and none of the areas are believed to have room for two farms. There will be concrete, physical challenges for the concession owners in the construction period if two farms with different owners are to be built concurrently. 2 Agreement established on 14 July 2014 between the Government, Denmark's Liberal Party, the Danish People's Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Red-Green Alliance to cancel the security of supply tax etc. and deregulate the PSO scheme. Side 8 af 14

9 Several actors suggested that the projects be made cheaper by removing the grid connection element from the projects. It is not possible to change the limit for the size of projects to > 200MW. Each area has been based on a maximum limit of 200MW throughout the planning process prior to the tendering procedure, i.e. in the preceding screening of the areas by the Offshore Wind Turbine Committee and the associated consultation, the political clearing process with the local municipalities, and in the determination of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) scope. The Danish Energy Agency believes it will be possible to exclude the possibility of placing several farms within each area, unless the farms are below 50MW each and both sides explicitly agree that this is acceptable. Grid connection will remain a part of the project. The reason for deciding to have grid connection as a part of the project is that the offshore wind farm and the connection to the grid are prepared together and that the siting must be optimal from a socio-economic perspective. There are no specifications on the size of the farms in the individual sites (except they cannot be larger than 200MW), and because of the overall limit of 350 MW and the total number of sites, it is not expected that all 6 sites will be exploited. This means there is neither time nor money to be saved from preparing grid connection prior to the project. The most optimal solution is therefore that the owner of the concession is responsible for both the offshore wind farm and the grid connection. Timetable Opinion varies with regard to the timetable. However, a majority of potential tenderers do not think that the timetable for establishment of the nearshore farms should be maintained while at the same time imposing a tight price cap in the tendering conditions. The general response was that with a tight price cap, it may be difficult to safeguard against delays, because it is expensive to remain prepared for all possible eventualities. It may also be difficult to find 'good offers' in subcontractors' pipeline. Furthermore, in the light of experience from the tendering procedure for Horns Rev 3, a very tight timetable up to submission of tenders is considered too risky. There is a wish for more flexibility in the timetable. One actor suggested allowing for submission of tenders at the politically determined completion date and also at a later completion date. Many actors would like a six-month time delay between prequalification and the 1st preliminary tenders, as well as a six-month time delay between the completion of the EIA and the 1st preliminary tenders. Finally, the importance of keeping to the timetable after it has been announced was also stressed. The completion date for establishment of the nearshore wind farms is set in the Energy Agreement and can therefore not be altered. The Danish Energy Agency is looking into other ways to make the timetable more flexible. The upcoming tender documents will stipulate time requirements. Side 9 af 14

10 The Danish Energy Agency recognises the importance of keeping the timetable for the tendering procedure. Grid connection Information was requested on how the new grid connection regime will be designed with the revision of the Executive Order no of 7 September 2010 on grid connection, as well as a plan for publication this. Amongst other things, actors called for a greater level of detail with regard to the coming grid connection regime, including clarification as to who is to pay for what; who will have construction and operational responsibility for which parts of the project; who bears the risk of breakdown and grid losses, etc. Furthermore, there were calls for clarification of the risk and compensation liability imposed on the concession owner with regard to breakdown of the grid onshore and offshore, respectively, or in the event of bottlenecks in the grid. The Danish Energy Agency is currently working on a revision of the Executive Order on grid connection, which, so far, is expected to be ready for public consultation before the end of this year. Energinet.dk's grid analysis will be published when there are answers to the questions above which have a bearing on the grid analysis. The Danish Energy Agency and Energinet.dk will subsequently host a seminar on these topics. The Danish Energy Agency will keep potential tenderers up to date via the Agency's website. Requirements for prequalification The market proposes a series of relaxations in the proposed model for prequalification. Most of the potential tenderers encouraged the Danish Energy Agency to reduce the financial requirements for prequalification and for the penalties and other financial requirements that are imposed on tenderers, primarily during the construction phase. Several actors suggested focusing on the companies' rating or creditworthiness rather than on requirements for turnover. Similarly, one company suggested 'number of employees in the company' as a supplementary requirement. It was proposed to relax the technical requirements so that companies are not required to have the necessary technical experience with wind turbine construction in-house, but that this requirement could be met through subcontractors or experience from operating wind turbines onshore. Before making the prequalification criteria public, the Danish Energy Agency will find an appropriate level for prequalification which will ensure that a broad range of actors and consortia can be prequalified, while, at the same time, ensuring that the prequalifying actors and consortia are capable of actually completing the projects. The financial prequalification will probably be on the basis of creditworthiness or rating, and requirements for turnover. The result of these considerations will be made public in the contract notice in the requirements for prequalification. These considerations will take account of the fact that the applicant must be able to match the expected investment. Side 10 af 14

11 The Danish Energy Agency will keep the requirement that the concession owner has at its disposal up-to-date experience with offshore wind turbine erection. However, the Agency will re-examine the form of this experience, e.g. binding contracts with subcontractors or similar. Award criterion The Danish Energy Agency has suggested tenders are submitted as the lowest price per kwh for the first 50,000 full load hours, i.e. the same model as for previously tendered offshore wind farms. The market is not in agreement about the preferred subsidy period. Parts of the market prefer a model in which settlement is over a longer period, and various proposals have been made for how this could be effectuated. Others have suggested that it be possible to receive the subsidy over a shorter period of time. There is general backing for the Danish Energy Agency to allow conditional bidding as a part of the award procedure. This means that it will be possible to submit a tender for a single farm as well as for all 350MW at a lower price. This will open up for economies of scale in the construction phase and thus push down prices. However, it is not recommended to double the requirement for turnover in connection with prequalification if a tenderer wants to submit a conditional bid for 350 MW, as this will preclude the majority of tenderers. The actors encouraged the Danish Energy Agency to describe how tenders are being prioritised if several tenders are at the same price, such that the total quantity for which tenders have been received exceeds the 350MW. Several tenderers have proposed that local ownership or local involvement be included in the award criterion or as requirements for the concession as a whole. Other local or environmental aspects are also suggested included in the assessment. For example, alternative models were proposed for socioeconomic assessments of the value of the nearshore wind farms, just as it was suggested that 'effective use of the area' be given weight. It was proposed that the cap be set at lower than 150 hours for the number of hours with an electricity market price equal to zero or negative and for which a price supplement is not given. The Danish Energy Agency will work on an award criterion which explicitly explains how the Danish Energy Agency will ensure, in the most socio-economically appropriate way, the establishment of 350MW on the basis of the tenders received. Tenders will only be acceptable at a price which leads to an average price for the total 350MW expansion of no more than DKK 0.70 per kwh. A price above this level has to be accepted by the parties to the energy agreement. It is vital that the final award criterion is transparent, that it puts all tenderers on a level playing field, and that tenderers have complete information about the criteria beforehand. The award criterion will be made public with the contract notice. On the basis of the Growth Agreement, the Danish Energy Agency expects to continue to provide the subsidies for the wind turbines per kwh for the first 50,000 peak load hours. In the tender specifica- Side 11 af 14

12 tions, the Danish Energy Agency will keep the requirements that no subsidies be paid for the first 150 hours in which the market price is zero or negative. It is important for the stability of the electricity market and the electricity grid that the offshore wind farms are partially exposed to the market signals so that they can contribute positively to re-establishing stability. The Danish Energy Agency expects to be able to provide opportunity for submitting conditional tenders. This means that a tenderer can make one tender for a single farm at a single location at a single price and/or one tender at a lower price conditional upon being awarded the concession to establish the total expansion with 350MW in two areas. The Danish Energy Agency will not make use of incentives for 'good use of the area' or other local environmental conditions in its assessment of the tenders, because the EIA report has already identified the terms to be followed if the project is to be kept within the framework of what is environmentally acceptable. The concession owner will have only a limited area available; however the concession owner will have the opportunity to optimise the farm within this area on the basis of the terms in the license for establishing the nearshore wind farm. In general, it is not possible to consider local ownership in the award of projects in EU tendering procedures. The EU single market regulations do not allow for this type of procedure, because it does not place all actors on a level playing field and it is considered discriminatory and anti-competitive. Furthermore, local ownership is catered for via the Option-to-Purchase scheme and the extra incentive for local ownership. Financial terms in the operating period Potential tenderers showed only slight interest in the extra incentive for local ownership which can lead to an additional price supplement of DKK 0.01/kWh to the settlement price. However, there were proposals for how the DKK 0.01 can be triggered already at 20% local ownership, just as it was suggested that any such supplement should only be paid to local shareholders. The Danish Energy Agency assesses that giving preferential treatment to local shareholders so that only local shareholders will be paid the extra settlement and not all owners of the project would be in contravention of Community Law, under the regulations for a level playing field in a tender. Furthermore, this would remove the incentive for non-local tenderers to work for greater local ownership. Penalty for defective performance, completion penalty and decommissioning guarantee There was a general understanding for the necessity of a penalty for defective performance, because there needs to be focus on getting the project launched and on attracting serious tenderers to make this happen. It was pointed out by several actors that a bank guarantee is more expensive than a parent company guarantee and, consequently, there was a call for only having a requirement for parent company guarantees. It was argued that this should be considered sufficient guarantee, because the company has already been prequalified and found adequately solid. Side 12 af 14

13 There is general understanding in the market for the Danish Energy Agency's requirement for a milestone plan for the project. It was pointed out that once the project has been commenced, a concession owner will have a large incentive to complete it, regardless of any economic sanctions for not making the deadline. Therefore, there is no understanding for putting tough sanctions on delays in completion of the farm. Several actors proposed that sanctions be replaced by an incentive for quick completion. There was a proposal to postpone the requirement for providing a decommissioning guarantee even more than 12 years. According to this proposal, the guarantee should also be phased in gradually. The Danish Energy Agency will examine the consequences of smaller penalties in case the projects are not completed or are delayed; and how an incentive regime for commencement and completion can be optimally designed taking into account the arguments submitted. The Danish Energy Agency will also examine the consequences of using parent company guarantees instead of bank guarantees. The Danish Energy Agency cannot provide an incentive for quick completion, because this would cause PSO costs to increase faster in the period before 2020 than anticipated in the Growth Agreement. The decommissioning guarantee will probably not be postponed further than 12 years. The final requirements will be published with the tender specifications. Option-to-Purchase scheme Parts of the market would prefer to cancel the Option-to-Purchase scheme. The concerns relate to the additional administrative burden, having to involve non-professional partners, a lack of understanding from foreign investors, and more. However, many actors are sympathetic to local citizens participating in the ownership of the offshore wind farms and recognise that the scheme can help foster greater understanding for the siting of wind farms and easier terms in the operating period, in particular. Parts of the market propose that the Option-to-Purchase scheme be designed in way that is more similar to onshore wind farm projects, in which local citizens are separated in an independent company with limited influence on construction decisions, or that the scheme is modified in some other way, e.g. by reducing the requirement to offer 20% of the shares for sale. The option-to-purchase scheme cannot be cancelled because the scheme has been an existing precondition during the entire preceding planning phase and political process around the tendering procedure for the nearshore wind turbines. Nor is it an option to separate local shareholders off into an independent company as with onshore wind farms, as this would incur a disproportionally high risk for the local shareholders and it would be difficult to administrate and supervise for the the supervising authority. Furthermore, this independent company would not be able to meet the technical and financial requirements required to get an authorisation to produce electricity. Side 13 af 14

14 The Danish Energy Agency is examining whether there are other possibilities for adjusting the Option-to-Purchase scheme according to the input from potential tenderers. Any adjustments will be communicated via the website. The Loss-of-Value scheme The technical dialogue has spurred different proposals for reducing the concession owner s risks in connection with the Loss-of-Value scheme. One proposal was that the entire amount be paid by the state, while others preferred a cap on how much a concession owner could have to pay on this scheme. The scheme has not been tested offshore before, so concession owners are faced with a partially unknown risk. Several actors suggested transferring a part of the risk on to the electricity consumers or tax payers through a price cap of DKK X million on the risk for concession owners. This is to be understood so that a total loss of value from each farm of more than DKK X million is to be paid by the electricity consumers/tax payers. The Loss-of-Value scheme cannot be abolished since the purpose of the scheme is to protect citizens that live close to the nearshore wind turbines and to safeguard that the concession owners take as much as possible consideration of neighbours to the wind farm. It is also the assessment that a cap on the maximum payment for loss of value for the individual site is not a politically viable solution. The Danish Energy Agency will make more information about the Loss-of-Value scheme available for the tenderers. This could be e.g. experience from onshore projects and the Valuation Authority's practice so far. Possibility for pilot element in the farm By far the majority of the market has expressed that they do not find a price-and-competition-based tendering form compatible with testing new elements. Testing requires time and flexibility and costs extra. Test elements can therefore not be included in an ordinary price-based tender, without the test element in some way or other being kept separate from the price competition. The Danish Energy Agency will not work further on promoting the possibilities for tests in the farms. If a concession owner choses to test elements in a wind farm, this must be kept within the framework stipulated with the license for establishing the nearshore wind farm. Side 14 af 14