1 Moralske beslutningssituationer Det Vide Reflekterede Ligevægtspunkt Forpligtelser: Hjælpe sin næste, betale skat, undgå at skade andre, beskytte miljøet, Rettigheder: Ret til ejendom, ret til uddannelse, ret til at forfølge sine ønsker, Placering af ansvar: Ulykker, katastrofer, konflikter, Retfærdighed: Fremme det gode, eliminere det onde, balancere rettigheder og pligter, Moralsk værdi: Lykke, værdighed, lyst, liv, Mill: Heller en lidende Sokrates end et tilfredsstillet svin. Hvad har moralsk værdi? Hvem er en moralsk agent (beslutningstager)? Wide Reflective Equilibrium The method of wide reflective equilibrium is an attempt to produce coherence in an ordered triple of sets of beliefs held by a particular person, namely, (a)a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background theories. We then propose alternative sets of moral principles that have varying degrees of "fit" with the moral judgments. We do not simply settle for the best fit of principles with judgments, however, which would give us only a narrow equilibrium. Instead, we advance philosophical arguments intended to bring out the relative strengths and weaknesses of the alternative sets of principles (or competing moral conceptions). These arguments can be construed as inferences from some set of relevant background theories (I use the term loosely). (p. 258) Generelle Krav til begrundelse af et WRE The background theories in (c) should show that the moral principles in (b) are more acceptable than alternative principles on grounds to some degree independent of (b)'s match with relevant considered moral judgments in (a). If they are not in this way independently supported, then there seems to be no gain over the support the principles would have had in a corresponding narrow equilibrium, where there never was any appeal to (c). The background theories should have a scope reaching beyond the range of the considered moral judgments used to "test" the moral principles. Some interesting, nontrivial portions of the set of considered moral judgments that constrains the background theories and of the set that constrains the moral principles should be disjoint. (p. 259) To klasser af velovervejde moralske domme Forskellige typer af teorier Level I: I will call level I the partial reflective equilibrium that holds between the moral principles and the relevant set of considered moral judgments. Baggrundsteorier Moralske principper Level II: Rawls kontrakt-mekanisme: We are led by philosophical argument, Rawls believes, to accept the contract and its various constraints as a reasonable device for selecting between competing conceptions of justice (or right). Principles chosen at level II are subject to two constraints: (i) they must match our considered moral judgments in (partial) reflective equilibrium; and (ii) they must yield a feasible, stable, well-ordered society. Velovervejede moralske domme Level III: These arguments, however, can be viewed as inferences from a number of relevant background theories, in particular, from a theory of the person, a theory of procedural justice, general social theory, and a theory of the role of morality in society (including the ideal of a well-ordered society). These level III theories, as I shall call them, are what persuade us to adopt the contract apparatus, with all its constraints (call it the level II apparatus). Level IV: Level IV contains the body of social theory relevant to testing level I principles (and level III theories) for "feasibility."
2 Rawls Arkimediske Punkt Baggrundsteorierne giver sammenhængen mellem moralske principper og intuitioner styrke: If I am right, then (supposing soundness of Rawls's arguments!), the detour of deriving the principles from the contract adds justificatory force to them, justification not found simply in the level I matching of principles and judgments. Notice that this advantage is exactly what would be lost if the contract and its defining conditions were "rigged" just to yield the best level I equilibrium. Uenighed om baggrundsteorier kan vælte det hele: The other side of this coin is that the level II apparatus will not be acceptable if competing theories of the person or of the role of morality in society are preferable to the theories Rawls advances. Rawls's Archimedean point is fixed only against the acceptability of particular level III theories. Tre Fordele ved WRE 1. Bedre analyse af moralsk uenighed: philosophers have often suggested that many apparently "moral" disagreements rest on other, nonmoral disagreements. Usually these are lumped together as the "facts" of the situation. Wide equilibrium may reveal a more systematic, if complex, structure to these sources of disagreement, and, just as important, to sources of agreement as well. 2. Faktorer som bestemmer moralske grunde: Second, aside from worries about universalizability and generalizability, philosophers have not helped us to understand what factors actually do constrain the considerations people cite as reasons, or treat as "relevant" and "important," in moral reasoning and argument. as in science, judgments about the plausibility and acceptability of various claims are the complex result of the whole system of interconnected theories already found acceptable. 3. Teoretisk uenighed mere håndterbar: A third possible benefit of wide equilibrium is that level III disagreements about theories may be more tractable than disagreements about moral judgments and principles. Consequently, if the moral disagreements can be traced to disagreements about theory, greater moral agreement may result. Kan Velovervejde Moralske Domme Revideres? Velovervejede moralske domme, eller kendsgerninger, kan revideres helt i stil med den måde, empiriske kendsgerninger i videnskaberne revideres på. In seeking wide reflective equilibrium, we are constantly making plausibility judgments about which of our considered moral judgments we should revise in light of theoretical considerations at all levels. No one type of considered moral judgment is held immune to revision. (p. 267) Wide reflective equilibrium keeps us from taking considered moral judgments at face value, however much they may be treated as starting points in our theory construction. Rather, they are always subjected to exhaustive review and are "tested," as are the moral principles, against a relevant body of theory. At every point, we are forced to assess their acceptability relative to theories that incorporate them and relative to alternative theories incorporating different considered moral judgments. (p. 267) Definition af mavesår Mavesår!er!en!fællesbetegnelse!for!et!sår!i! mavesækken!(latin:!ulcus!ventriculi)!eller!et!sår!i! tolvfingertarmen!(latin:!ulcus!duodeni).! Mavesårsbakterien,!Helicobacter!pylori,!er!en! bakterie,!som!forårsager!ca.!90%!af!sår,!der!ses!i! tolvfingertarmen!og!ca.!80%!af!alle!sår,!der!optræder! i!mavesækken.efter!barry!marshalls!og!robin! Warrens!opdagelse!af!denne!bakterie!i!1982!og!dens! rolle!i!udviklingen!af!mavesår!er!behandlingen!af! denne!sygdom!forbedret!betragteligt,!idet!en! fjernelse!af!bakterien!ved!brug!af!antibiotika!(i! kombination!med!syrenedsættende!midler)!som! regel!medfører!helbredelse.!tidligere!behandledes! mavesår!udelukkende!med!midler!til!reduktion!af! mavens!indhold!af!mavesyre.!særligt!ondartede! tilfælde!kunne!kræve!fjernelse!af!en!del!af! mavesækken!ved!kirurgisk!indgreb,!men!tilstanden! var!kronisk!og!kunne!medføre!livsvarig!invaliditet. Teori om Mavesår En medicinsk teori om mavesår består bl.a. af følgende Konkrete empiriske kendsgerninger vedrørende mavesår baseret på direkte observationer og eksperimenter (både kliniske og laboratoriebaserede) Lovmæssigheder vedrørende behandling af mavesår forskellige medikamenters virkemåde, kirurgiske procedure, risikofaktorer, Baggrundsteorier: Anatomiske teorier, fysiologiske teorier, farmakologi, biokemi, En forudsætning for, at teorien accepteres, er, at de forskellige elementer udgør et kohærent hele. Medicinsk forskning består bl.a. I at udvikle, forbedre og vedligeholde sådanne teorier. Dannelse af Mavesår p.gr. Helicobacter pylori Dannelse af et mavesår pga Helicobacter pylori (1) Mavesårsbakterien gennembryder mavesækkens beskyttende slimlag.(2) Der dannes Ammoniak som neutraliserer mavesyren i slimlaget.(3) Derved får bakterierne bedre livsbetingelser.(4) Mavesåret er fuldendt med opløsning af slimlaget og giver mavesyren fri adgang til at ætse slimhinden.
3 John Lykoudis ( ) Observationsrapporter og moralske domme John Lykoudis var en praktiserende læge i Grækenland, som behandlede mavesår med antibiotika længe før Helicobacter pylori var kendt. Hans arbejde blev ikke anerkendt. Tværtimod blev han idømt en bøde i 1968 på 4000 Drachma for at have behandlet sine patienter med antibiotika. Observation reports seem to satisfy these conditions because we can tell some story, perhaps a causal story, that explains why the reports are generally reliable, though still revisable. In contrast, moral judgments are more suspect. We know that even sincerely believed moral judgments made under conditions conducive to avoiding mistakes may still be biased by self-interest, selfdeception, or cultural and historical influences. (p. 270) Observationsrapporter baseres på kausale historier, hvorimod moralske domme ikke har noget tilsvarende og dermed er udsat for fejltolkninger, bedrag og ideologiske forskydninger. WRE og Videnskabelig Praksis Data Reduction I suggest that wide equilibrium closely resembles scientific practice. Neither in science nor in ethics do we merely "test" our theories against a pre- determined, relatively fixed body of data. Rather, we continually reassess and reevaluate both the plausibility and the relevance of these data against theories we are inclined to accept. The possibil- ity thus arises that these pressures for revision will free considered moral judgments from their vulnerability to many of the specific objections about bias and unreliability usually directed against them. (p. 273) Sea level Area above sea level Dots represent places where the gravitational field has been measured The Geoid Research!Object
4 Research Object as Instance of a Generic Object The research object is defined as an isolated and manipulated part of the world, which is conceptualised as an instance of a generic object. The preparation process involves at least three processes: (i) delimitation of the object, (ii) abstraction from irrelevant properties, and (iii) Idealisation. Model Object A model object is a generic object introduced in order to classify and identify research objects. A research object is an entity, which can be viewed as an instance of a model object. Model objects are abstract conceptual entities, and they are the proper targets of scientific theories. All basic properties measured and analysed in the laboratory are comprehended as properties of the generic object. The actual object represents the generic object. Truth Two!Levels!of!Moral!Reasoning Practical Level Ordinary common behaviour is in general regulated by intuitive, vague, prima facie principles which are established by education, experience, and professional training. Everyday ethics is a kind of competence which is sufficient for regulation of nearly all ordinary moral situations Deep ethical conflicts - appearing, for instance, when new technology is introduced - cannot in general be assimilated within common everyday ethics. Theoretical Level Critical thinking consists in making a choice under the constraints imposed by the logical properties of the moral concepts and by non-moral facts, and by nothing else. Critical principles can be of unlimited specificity. Formålenes Rige The!Categorical!Imperative Ved rige forstår jeg den af fælles love skabte systematiske enhed mellem fornuftsvæsener. Lovene bestemmer formålene med hensyn til deres almengyldighed. Ser man derfor bort fra fornuftsvæsenernes forskelle og fra deres private formål indhold, så kan der tænkes et hele af alle formål i systematisk forbindelse. Der kan med andre ord tænkes et formålenes rige muliggjort af ovenstående principper. (Kant: Grundlæggelse af moralens metafysik, p.216) Autonomy. I ought never to act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law. Dignity of Persons. Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only. Legislation for a moral Community. All maxims that proceed from our own making of law ought to harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature.
5 Universalizability Agent"Neutral!Reasons if!we!make!different!moral!judgements! about!situations!which!we!admit!to!be! identical!in!their!universal!descriptive! properties,!we!contradict!ourselves. (Hare:!Moral!Thinking,!p.!21) Situations!with!no!morally!relevant! differences!must!be!treated!in!equivalent! ways!. Agent-neutral reasons do not have to find a miraculous source in our personal lives, because we are not merely personal beings: we are also importantly and essentially viewers of the world from nowhere within it - and in this capacity we remain open to judgments of value, both general and particular. The possibility of agent-neutral values is evident as soon as we begin to think from this standpoint about the reality of any reasons whatever. If we acknowledge the possibility of realism, then we cannot rule out agentneutral values in advance. (Nagel: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, p.112) Autonomous!reasons Deontological!reasons The first type of reason stems from the desires, projects, commitments, and personal ties of the individual agent, all of which give him reasons to act in the pursuit of ends that are his own. (Nagel: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values) The second type of reason stems from the claims of other persons not to be maltreated in certain ways. What I have in mind are not agent-neutral reasons for everyone to want it to be the case that no one is maltreated, but agent-relative reasons for each individual not to maltreat others himself, in his dealing with them (e.g. by violating their rights, breaking his promises to them, etc.) (Nagel: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values) Agent!Relative!Reasons Autonomous reasons would limit what we are obliged to do in the service of agent-neutral values. Deontological reasons would limit what we are permitted to do in the service of either agent-neutral or autonomous ones. Ethical!Reasons Common sense suggests that each of us should live our own live (autonomy), have some significant concern for the general good (agent-neutral values), and treat the people he deals with decently (deontology). It also suggests that these aims may produce serious inner conflict. (Nagel: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values)
6 Agent!Neutral!Considerations Respect!for!the!environment The!community:!Jobs,!health,! Principles!of!Justice,!e.g.!fair!balance!between!rights!and! obligations Duties:!Respect!for!contracts,!loyalty,!stand!on!one s! responsibility,!don t!maltreat!other!persons,! Autonomous!Considerations A!person!has!the!right!to!develop!and!protect!his!own! personal!identity,!e.g.!as!a!responsible!engineer. A!person!has!the!right!to!pursue!his/her!own!values,!desires,! projects,! A!person s!!obligation!towards!agent!neutral!and! deontological!considerations!is!restricted,!e.g.!if!the! engineer s!job!is!threatened!then!his/her!obligation!to!pursue! unrealistic!or!unreachable!agent!neutral!goals!is!overridden. Deontological!Considerations Respect!for!the!rights!and!autonomous!values!of!other! persons,!e.g.!don t!let!down!or!betray!the!manager. Obligation!to!prevent!the!company!to!hurt!citizens!or!at!least! not!to!participate!in!such!actions. Protect!and!help!people!that!suffer!or!are!put!in!danger,!e.g.! help!people!involved!in!serious!accidents,!exposed!to!serious! pollution,! Institutional!Values! Autonomous!rights!of!the!company.!Improve!profit,! competitive!power,!reputation,!etc. Deontological!obligations!of!the!company.!Respect!the! integrity!of!employees,!respect!the!rights!of!other! institutions,! Universal!values.!Promote!general!welfare,!principles!of! justice,!principles!of!autonomy,!protect!the!environment,! religious!values,!human!rights,! The!Circumstances!of!Justice External!Circumstances:!Distribution!of!goods!in!a!society! with!sparse!resources,!questions!of!economic!and!technical! priorities,!equal!treatment!of!citizens,! Internal!Circumstances:!Persons!have!different!preferences,! needs,!desires,!expectations,!etc.!and!pursue!different!goals.! They!have!the!freedom!to!live!their!own!lives.!! Ethical!Decision!Making The!Circumstantial Analysis:!Analyse,!explain,!and!unravel!technical,!legal,! and!ethical!facts The!Counterfactual!Analysis:!How!would!disinterested!or!impartial,!but! potential!users!of!the!institutions!(decisions,!actions, )!under! consideration,!organise!and!decide!with!regard!to!these!institutions,!rules,! or!procedures!such!that!all!involved!would!be!treated!in!a!fair!and!just! way? Consistency:!Investigate!the!mutual!consistency!of!suggested!rules,! principles,!and!values!and!their!harmony!with!other!(technical,!social,! individual, )!requirements.!
7 Objektivitet WRE constrains theory justification, not truth First, in a given area of inquiry, claims are thought to be objective if there is some significant degree of intersubjective agreement on them. Second, claims are also said to be objective if they express truths relevant to the area of inquiry. Other important senses of "objectivity" reduce to one or both of the central uses [e.g., "free from bias" (said of methods or claims) and "reliability" or "replicability" (said of methods or procedures of inquiry)]. The two central senses are not unrelated. (p.274) In short, divergence among wide reflective equilibria does not imply that there are no such things as objective moral truths; nor does convergence imply that we have found them; nor need 'moral truth' be replaced by 'adopted in wide equilibrium'. How we will be motivated, or warranted, in treating the facts of divergence or convergence depends on the kinds of divergence or convergence we encounter and the kinds of explanation we can give for it. This result should not surprise us: wide reflective equilibrium embodies coherence constraints on theory acceptance or justification, not on truth. (p.277) Argument for Realisme Consider for a moment a general argument of this form: (1) In a given area of inquiry, the methods used are successful in the sense that they produce convergence and a growth of knowledge; (2) (2) the only plausible account of the success of these methods is that they lead us to better and better approximations to truths of the kind relevant to the inquiry; (3) (3) therefore, we should adopt a realist ac- count of the relevant objects of inquiry. (p. 278) we have some reason to think that wide equilib- rium involves methods that will lead us to objective moral truths if there are any. Notice that this conclusion does not presuppose there are such moral truths, nor does it give an account of what kind of truth such a truth would be. (p. 280)