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1 Fra: Sendt: Til: Emne: Udenrigsministeriets Kommunikationscenter 2 (t) [compostind@um.dk] 30. januar :43 Official Mailbox, Ankara Embassy; Official Mailbox, Athens Embassy; Official Mailbox. Beijing Embassy; Officiel Mailbox, Berlin Ambassade; Officiel Mailbox. Bryssel DANATO; Official Mailbox. Damascus Embassy; Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste; Forsvarsministeriet; Official Mailbox, Helsinki Embassy; Official Mailbox. Islarnabad Embassy; Official Mailbox, Cairo Embassy; Official Mailbox, London Embassy; Official Mailbox, Madrid Embassy; Official Mailbox. Mexico Embassy; Official Mailbox, Moscow Embassy; Official Mailbox. New York UN Mission; Official Mailbox, Oslo Embassy; Official Mailbox, Ottawa Embassy; Official Mailbox, Paris Embassy; "Ramallah, Repræsentationskontoret"; Official Mailbox, Riyadh Embassy; Official Mailbox, Santiago Embassy; Official Mailbox. Sofia Embassy; Statsministeriet; Official Mailbox, Stockholm Embassy; Official Mailbox, Tehran Embassy; Official Mailbox, Tel Aviv Embassy; Official Mailbox, Warsaw Embassy; Official Mailbox, Washington Embassy; Official Mailbox, Vienna Embassy; Arkiv7 (t);"hjortsra, Michael Just" RTL VS: EU-Rep. Bruxelles (L)- Situationen i Irak: Redegrarelse i EP fra h~jtstaende repræsentant med debat d EP-Irak doc Til: Ankara, Ambassaden(R379); Athen, Ambassaden(R379); Beijing, Ambassaden(R379); Berlin, Ambassaden(R379); Bryssel, DANATO(R379); Damaskus. Ambassaden(R379); Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste; Forsvarsministeriet: Helsingfors, Ambassaden(R379); Islarnabad. Ambassaden(R379); Kairo, Ambassaden(R379); London, Ambassaden(R379); Madrid, Ambassaden(R379); Mexico, Ambassaden(R379); Moskva, Ambassaden (R379); New York. FN-Missionen(R379); Oslo, Ambassaden(R379); Ottawa, Ambassaden(R379); Paris, Ambassaden (R379); Ramallah, Repræsentationskontoret(R379); Riyadh, Ambassaden(R379); Santiago, Ambassaden(R379); Sofia, Ambassaden(R379); Statsministeriet; Stockholm. Ambassaden(R379); Teheran, Ambassaden(R379); Tel Aviv, Ambassaden(R379); Warszawa, Ambassaden(R379); Washington. Ambassaden(R379); Wien, Ambassaden & FN- Missionen(R379) Udenrigsministeriet. den :42 i Desk By: , Journalnummer: 400.E.l l.irak -----Oprindelig meddelelse----- Fra: SMELA Sendt: 30. januar :21 Til: Hiortsra., ~ Michael, Just Emne: VS: EU-Rep. Bruxelles (L)- Situationen i Irak: Redegorelse i EP fra hrajtstaende repræsentant med debat -----Oprindelig meddelelse----- Fra: Telefordeling (t) Sendt: 30. januar :22 Til: Faaborg-Andersen. Lars; S.MELA Cc: Damsgaard, Anders Carsten; N.SP; Janson, Kaare E.; N.EUS Emne: EU-Rep. Bruxelles (L)- Situationen i Irak: Redegorelse i EP fra h~jtstaende repræsentant med debat Statsministeriet 3 i JAN J.nu.5~1c-3~

2 Fra: UM - Komcenter (t) Sendt: 29. januar :40 Til: Telefordeling (t) Emne: VS: EU-Rep. Bruxelles REP334 - Situationen i Irak: Redegmelse i EP fra h~jtstaende repræsentant med debat -----Oprindelig meddelelse----- Fra: Aggernæs, Lene S. Sendt: 29. januar :34 Til: UM - Komcenter (t) Cc: S.MELA; N.SP: N.EUS; BRUREP, Arkiv; Aggernæs, Lene S. Emne: EU-Rep. Bruxeiies REP334 - Situationen i Irak: Redegmelse i EP fra hgjtstaende repræsentant med debat Til: Udenrigsministeriet:S.MELA;N.SP;N.EUS EU-Repræsentationen Bruxelies E-post REP334 af 29. januar :33:45 Desk By: , 10:OO J.nr.: 400.A.5-4 Situationen i Irak: Redegnreise i EP fra h~jtstaende repræsentant med debat EU-repræsentationen, Bruxelles. formel e-post den 29. januar 2003 Uklassificeret J.nr. 400.A.5-4 Desk for SMELA by 30. januar kl Kopi: N.SP og NEUS Situationen i Irak: Redegmelse i Europa-Parlamentet fra den heijtstaende repræsentant med efterfdgende debat Sammenfatning: Den h~jtstaende repræsentant, Kommissæren for udenrigsanliggender og Europa-Parlamentets medlemmer udtrykte en generel enighed om ~nsket om en fredelig I~sning på Irak-situationen. Der var konsensus om at give vabeninspekt~rerne den tid, de nnsker, samt generel afstandtagen til en militær operation uden mandat fra Sikkerhedsradet. <<EP-lrak doc>> Pavleb Lars Bo M@llerlLene Aggernæs EU-Repræsentationen Bruxelles REP334 <<EP-lrak doc>>

3 EU-reprzsentationen, Bruxelles, formel e-post 334 den 29. januar 2003 Ukiassificeret Desk for S.MEL-1 by 30. januar 2003, kl Situationen i Irak: Redegerelse i Europa-Parlamentet fra den hejtstående reprzsentant med efterfdgende debat Sammenfitnin~: Den hojtstiende reprzsentant, I<ommisszren for udenrigsanliggender og Europa-Parlamentets medlemmer udtrykte en generel enighed om mnsket om en fredelig lmsning på Irak-situationen. Der rar konsensus om at give vibeninspektmrerne den tid, de mnsker, samt generel afstandtagen til en militair operation uden mandat fra Sikkerhedsrådet. Rejfirat Den hoitstaende reuraisentant for den fzlles udenries- o sikkerheds~olitik, Tavier Solana fremforte med henvisning u1 samråd mellem troikaen og de fire EU-lande reprzsenteret i FN's Sikkerhedsråd samt Ridsmmde (udenrigsanliggender), begge mandag, fire punkter, hvorom der rar konsensus: 1. Irak skal ikke hare massemdelzggelsesviben 2. Det er Iraks ansvar at samarbejde aktivt 3. Vibeninspektorerne skal have mere tid, flere midler og efterretninger (herunder udlevering af oplysninger fra USA's side) 4. Alle aktioner skal fortsztte inden for FNs rammer Solana understregede således vigtigheden af opfyldelsen af resolution 1441 og afvzbning af Saddam Hussein uden militzr aktion. Om end hovedvzgten var på Irak noterede Solana sig mht. I\lellemosten at fredslejren i Israel havde lidt et stort nederlag ved valget, der i mvrigt overraskende nok var kendetegnet ved den laveste valgdeltagelse siden EU måtte tage resultatet i betragtning og fortsat gmre alt for at bringe fredsprocessen i sikker havn. I<ornmisszr for udenrigsanlizender. Chris Patten fremhzvede i et relativt mere bastant indlzg en afvaibning af Irak gennem våbeninspektmrerne som den optimale lmsning. Det var således vigtigt i hvilket omfang Saddam Hussein samarbejdede. Desvzrre vat der ikke meget der tydede pi, at Hussein havde lzrt ikke at udfordre omverdenen. Hvis ikke våbeninspektmrernes virke gav de nodvendige resultater, måtte man konfrontere udfordringen, helst i FN-regi. Ellers kunne det fi meget vide konsekvenser for FN-systemet og mdelzgge forholdet u1 den islamiske verden. Fra den efterfdgende gruppeordfmrermnde kan flg. fremhzves:

4 Alle de politiske gruppers ordforere understregede behovet for at sikre en fredelig losning gennem FX-srstemet. Der rar ligeledes enighed om, at rabeninspektorerne skulle harde den piluxrede tid'til fuldt ud at gennemfore deres mission og have alie relerante oplysninger, herunder fra CSLi, til radighed. En rzkke indlxg - sxrligt fra \-ensae side i salen - stillede sig overfor US-\'s motix-er med henvisning u1 prioritering af indsats omkring olieomrader samt krxïede konkrete beriser pa, ar Irak faktisk besad masseodel~~gelsesraben. Bebo\-er for at Europa talte med én stemme rar ligeledes et gennemgående tema sammen med behol-et ar inddrage bl.a. de hurnanitzre konsek\~enser af en erentuel rnilitzr aktion samt lilarere visioner om, h ~ader skulle fdge efter Saddam's diktatur. Beslutningsforslag om situationen i Irak 1-11 blive fremlagt til afstemning i Parlamentet den 30 januar 2003 mellem 11 og 13. Den dragne tekst ri1 snarligt derefter blive lagt ud på Parlamentets hjemmeside: \vw~-.europarl.eu.int. Par/eb Lars Bo Lioller/Lene Aggernxs

5 H~eg-Jensen, Kasper (STM) Pf/f Pif? / Fra: Sendt: Til: Cc: Emne: Formel E-post: Klassifikation: Jeppesen, Michael Lund 4. februar :29 UM - Komcenter (t); Statsministeriet (UM) N.SP; N.USA; S.MELA; Statsministeriet (UM); Forsvarsministeriet 3.afd (UM); Official Mailbox, New York UN Mission Ambassaden Washington, ammail 85 af 4. februar 2003: Irak - forskellen på efterretninger og beviser. Nej UNCLASSIFIED -4mbassaden \T-ashington, ammail 83 af 4. febmar 2003 Desk by den 5.2 for K.SP. Kopi STAI, FbN, N.USA%, S..MELA Bedes videresendt til FE Irak - forskellen på efterretninger og beviser. 5.E.Irak Vedlagt fremsendes til ministeriets underretning et indlzg bragt i Washington Post den 2. febmar 2003 om forskellen mellem efterretninger og beviser i relation til Irak. Ambassaden fulder artiklen ulteressant som optakt til og baggnind for udenrigsminister Powells tale i morgen i FY..Artiklen er reprzsentativ for en rzkke lignende indlzg af efterretningseksperter og kommentatorer bragt i amerikanske medier de seneste dage. St~fsrninisteriet pv/eb ;\licliael Lund Jeppesen E$ 24L The Big Difference Between Intelligence And Evidence By Bmce Berkowiiz Sunday, Febmac- 2, 2003: Page B01 Tune into any radio or television discussion about foreign policy lately, and you would think you were watching remns of Perry Mason. The issue may be a North Korean weapon of mass destruction. Or it may be Iraqi weapons of mass destmction. Or even Iraqi links to al Qaeda. But whatever the question, we always seem to hear that U.S. intelligence is searching for "proof." Or "evidence." Or the ever-popular "smoking gun." This kind of talk implies that, if we could just collect enough intelligence, we would settle these questions. The idea has even been built into the language of people on both sides of the issue. Opponents of military action say they want proof of a violation. Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), for example, has demanded "convincing evidence of an imminent threat before we send troops to war with Iraq." Even President Bush, who needs no convincing about whether Iraq's potential threat is reason enough for action, has been drawn into the linguistic quagmire. Last week he cited "evidence from intelligence sources" and said Secretary of State Colin L. Powell would use "information and intelligence" to make the case to the U.N. Security Council.

6 The assumption is that, with enough effort, we will have what people are calling an "Adlai Stevenson moment." You can almost see it in your mind -- the fuzzy black-and-white TV images of October Stevenson, U.S delegate to the United Nations, holds up aerial photos of Soviet missile launchers in Cuba taken by U-2 spy planes. Soviet delegate Valerian Zorin -- who previously denied the weapons were there -- declines to explain "I am prepared to wait for my answer until hel1 freezes over," Stevenson says. Powell's address to the United Nations this week might provide a similar moment -- but don't count on it. In any case, such courtroom-style theater is beside the point. The idea of the presentation of a decisive piece of admissible, convincing evidence might be an appealing metaphor, but it is a misleading one. Usually intelligence does not offer crystal-clear answers, and we should not hang decisions to go to war or do anything else on its ability to do so. In my own experience, intelligence is usually ful1 of uncertainty. In the intelligence business, foolproof, airtight evidence -- the kind that changes minds and convinces the public -- is, as one of my first branch chiefs at the CIA used to tell me, as "rare as hens' teeth." That's why expecting intelligence to provide "proof' in the legal sense of the word is so dangerous. Detective work and intelligence collection may resemble each other, but they are really completely different. Detectives aim at meeting a specific legal standard -- "probable cause," for example, or "beyond a reasonahle doubt" or "preponderance of evidence." It depends on whether you want to start an investigation, put a suspect in jail or win a civil suit. Intelligence, on the other hand, rarely tries to prove anything; its main purpose is to inform officials and military commanders. The clock runs differently for detectives and intelligence analysts, too. Intelligence analysts -- one hopes -- go to work before a crisis; detectives usually go to work after a crime. Law enforcement agencies take their time and doggedly pursue as many leads as they can. Intelligence analysts usually operate against the clock. There is a critical point in time where officials have to "go with what they've got," ambiguous or not. But the higgest difference -- important in all the current controversies -- is that intelligence agencies have to deal with opponents who take countermeasures. Indeed, usually the longer one collects information against a target, the better the target becomes at evasion. So do other potential targets, who are free to watch. When did we start acting as though intelligence analysts were law enforcement detectives? The turning point may have heen the 1970s, when monitoring arms control treaties hecame an important intelligence mission. The issue was whether the Soviet Union was "in violation" of an asreement. Intelligence hecame a political issue, mainly because it was central to the question of whether or not arms control was working -- a huge point of disagreement hetween hawks and doves. It got worse about a decade ago, when a new buzzword began percolating through intelligence circles. Intelligence officials began saying that their goal was to provide "actionable intelligence." Originally this was a military term for intelligence precise enough and timely enough to tell you where to put a bomb or intercept a target. In time, though, the term mutated. Actionable intelligence these days refers to data so clear and so thorough that policymakers can, literally, base a decision to take action on it. Alas, by transmuting this term, we inadvertently moved the burden of making policy decisions from the shoulders of officials and politicians (where it belongs) to the shoulders of case officers and analysts (where it does not). The truth is, this was convenient for senior officials. If they did not have good enough intelligence, they could be excused for not taking action -- and the analysts would get the blame. But do we really want to put these issues in the hands of career intelligence analysts? As we wonder whether to wage war against Iraq, it's worth rememhering that U.S. intelligence did not detect Iraq's nuclear program until it was uncovered after Desert Storm in It did not find out about the Iraqi biological weapons program until 1995, with some help from the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law. Sept. 11 showed what happens if you wait too long for "actionable intelligence." American leaders kept watching while a threat developed hefore our eyes. We had good information about the training camps in Afghanistan, and there were strong signs that al Qaeda was behind the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa and the 1999 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen.

7 The problem was that officials never believed that U.S. intelligence had met the threshold required to trigger action against al Qaeda networks or training camps. Tme, our intelligence organizations could have done a much better job in anticipating the Sept. 11 attack. But it was the search for intelligence concrete enough to be used as evidence --just the search we are engaged in today -- that led to intelligence failures that were, in part, really policy failures. Instead of waiting for actionable intelligence, we need to start thinking about how to make policy based on "inferential intelligence" -- that is, by using analysis and logic. On Iraq, that means asking: Did Hussein commit billions of dollars and thousands of technicians to building nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, then suddenly drop those programs? Or did he develop those weapons -- and hide them? Intelligence cannot answer this -- at least not in any way that might be described as actionable. Yet a program successfully hidden would still call just as urgently for U.S. military action. Instead of a Stevenson moment, the model for most policy decisions should be the "John McCone moment." Shortly after McCone became director of the Central Intelligence Agency under President Kennedy, his analysts told him that they had spotted Soviet antiaircraft missiles in Cuba. The analysts believed the missiles were there only to defend Cuban ports and airbases, but McCone believed they were precursors to Soviet offensive missiles. He knew that the Soviets lagged behind the United States in nuclear weapons and that they wanted to fix the problem. The temptation to use Cuha as a base was an irresistible solution. So McCone insisted on more U-2 flights to look for offensive missiles in Cuha, despite the lack of hard evidence, despite the risks to the pilots, and despite the doubts of his own analysts and most of the National Security Council that Soviet leaders would deploy such weapons. McCone brought logic and reason to bear where evidence was lacking, took action and took responsibility. Those flights were how Stevenson got his opportunity to corner Zorin. So, I am looking fonvard to watching Secretary Powell "make his case" before the United Nations. But, in the end, intelligence shouldn't decide what we do. There rnay be no smoking gun. It's the nature of the intelligence business. Elected officials will have to perform the job they are paid to do: Judge. Decide. Lead Brzrce Berkoiv~tr 1s a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior anaiyst at RAND. He began his career at the Central Intelligence Agency. His hook "Ile New Face of War" (Free Press) will be pzrblished in March. O 2003 The Washington Post Company