DI s Executive Program 2010

Transkript

1 DI s Executive Program 2010 Modul 3: Studietur til Kina fra den november 2010 KINA RAPPORT Deltagere Adm. Direktør Bo Lybæk, GPV International, Managing Director Jette Lykke Mikkelsen, RMIG A/S, Chief Technology Officer Kjeld Pietraszek, Radiometer Medical ApS, Sales Director EEMEA Brian Noetzli, Radiometer Medical ApS, HR Manager Peter Bisgaard, Radiometer Medical ApS, R&D Manager Kasper Oktavio Schweitz, Radiometer Medical ApS, Adm. Direktør Henrik Lundgaard, SK Forsyning A/S, Director of Reliability Engineering Susanne Lindegaard, Oticon A/S, Generalsekretær Gitte Seeberg, Verdensnaturfonden WWF, Salesog Marketingdirektør Jakob Thøisen, Palsgaard A/S, Erhvervsøkonomisk chef Kent Damsgaard, DI, Produktionschef Ole Hjort Magnussen, Royal Arctic Logistics A/S, Chefkonsulent Vagn Riis, DI, Ledelsesudviklingskonsulent Bente Toftkær, DI. 1

2 Forord Rapporten gengiver opdagelser, funderinger og forståelser fra studieturens mange møder med både danske og kinesiske erhvervsfolk. Formålet med studieturen er at få sat globaliseringen, dens konsekvenser og muligheder for danske virksomheder på dagsordenen. Hvorfor så tage til Kina? Kina er verdens næststørste økonomi og forudsiges at være den største i Landets verdenspolitiske indflydelse vokser og Kina udgør en vigtig drivkraft bag den globale økonomiske vækst. Den kinesiske regering forventer en vækstrate på 10 procent i Trenden går mod, at Kina vil udvikle sig fra et u- land, baseret på billig arbejdskraft til i højere grad at være et i-land, baseret på teknologi, innovation og specialiseret arbejdskraft. Med en befolkning på mere end 1 mia. mennesker med stigende købekraft, udgør Kina også et stort potentiale for afsætning af en lang række produkter, produceret af danske virksomheder. For at følge med i og sikre sig adgang til den fremtidige økonomiske vækst er det helt centralt for danske topledere at have en forståelse for de præmisser, der kendetegner udviklingen i Kina. Guidelines for rapportskrivning Rapporten er en slags dagbog over de mange besøg og indtryk som deltagerne fik på turen. Referaterne er skrevet af grupperne se nedenstående oversigt og indeholder følgende: Fakta: besøgsdato, virksomhedsnavn, adresse og virksomhedsrepræsentant Kommentarer vedr. de 4 fokus områder (jf. ovenstående oversigt) Hvad gjorde mest indtryk? Hvad er læringspunkterne? Hvilke perspektiver giver besøget anledning til i forhold til (strategiske) aktiviteter i egen organisation? Referatet skrives på engelsk i de tilfælde, hvor det er nødvendigt af hensyn til virksomhedsrepræsentanten. Virksomhedsrepræsentanterne har haft referaterne til gennemsyn inden de er samlet i nærværende rapport. Gruppeoversigt: Gruppe 1: Henrik, Susanne og Kasper Gruppe 2: Jakob, Jan og Kent Gruppe 3: Peter, Bo og Gitte Gruppe 4: Jette, Brian, Ole og Kjeld 2

3 Fokusområder Fokusområde Uddybning Eksempler Praksis The Growing Kina er et kæmpemarked med utrolige muligheder sådan ser mange danske virksomheder det. Danske virksomheder: DEIF (Kinesisk ledelse, kan medføre spørgsmål om det at være ansat i en Market dansk virksomhed!), Hvordan tænkes strategien og Dantherm, Danfoss, hvordan implementeres den? Grundfos og Aalborg- Industries New Competitors A Rising Economic and Political Power World s Factory Kina har en række kinesisk ejede virksomheder som er på vej ind på de vestlige markeder som f.eks. Europa. Er de kinesiske virksomheder i det hele taget konkurrencedygtige og hvordan vil de trænge ind på det europæiske marked? Kina vokser både som økonomisk og politisk magt. Hvordan vil dette komme til at præge det kommende årtis økonomiske og politiske udvikling i verden? Kan Kina fortsætte væksten og hvilke indbyggede udfordringer ligger der forude? Kina bliver kaldt verdens fabrik. Arbejdskraften er billig, rimeligt veluddannet og der er rigeligt af den, blot man flytter længere ind i landet. Hvordan kan danske virksomheder fortsat drage fordel heraf og hvilke problemer skal virksomhederne især holde sig for øje? Kinesiske virksomheder: Vi besøger Chang an Auto (Volvo/Ford) CSIC Haizhuang Desuden er der f.eks.: Haier, Loncin Motocycle, Qing Dao beer, etc. General Manager Anders Kjøller, OMIC (DI Asia-Base) Innovation Center Denmark Danske virksomheder: KK Elektronic, (Why joint venture in China er et godt spørgsmål her!) Nilfisk-Advance, Foss. etc Fokus på strategier i et globalt perspektiv. Hvor stort er/bliver dette marked? Hvad ser vi af konkurrence fra Kina lige nu? - Hvor stærk bliver den? Ex: Køb af dele af SAAB - Køb af Volvo. Vestas taber markedsandele i Kina og hele verdenen Set demonstreret COP15 Hvad er der ellers af signaler? Hvad med kulturforskelle? Er der stadigvæk fordel? Hvis der er, hvilke? Hvad skal vi specielt være opmærksomme på? 3

4 Programoversigt og opgavefordeling Formiddag Søndag 14/11 Mandag 15/11 CEIBS Hvad laver CEIBS Grp. 2 Tirsdag 16/11 Foss Konkurrenter i Kina og globalt? Grp. 1 Onsdag 17/11 Go West Strategy on Chongqing Royal Danish consulat Grp. 2 kk-qianwei Kinesisk- Dansk Joint venture Grp. 4 City Planning Museum Infrastruktur: In Chongqing inkl. Gorges Dam projektet Torsdag 18/11 Retur til Shanghai Suzhou industripark Dantherm Det voksende marked Grp. 4 Fredag 19/11 DEIF A/S Underleverandør til vindmølle industrien Grp. 2 Opsamling på besøg og møder refleksioner og konklusioner BET/VAR Grp. 1 Eftermiddag Ankomst i Shanghai Velkommen til Kina Anders Kjøller, OMIC Grp. 1 Danisco Global og lokal salgsstrategi Grp. 3 Danfoss Strategier for Kina Grp. 4 Nilfisk Advance Produktion til det lokale marked eller det globale? Grp. 3 Afgang til Chongqing CSIC Haizhuang Producent af vindmøller - Kinesisk konkurrent? Grp. 2 Changan Volvo production Volvo er solgt til kinesisk konkurrent? Aalborg Industries Strategien for Kina? Grp. 1 Shanghai på egen hånd Grp. 3 Aften Middag i Shanghai Middag i Shanghai Ankomst i Chongqing Middag i Chongqing Middag i Shanghai Afslutningsmiddag i Shanghai Hjemrejse 4

5 Velkommen til Kina v/anders Kjøller, DI OMIC Søndag d. 14. nov. Sted: Radisson Shanghai The Growing Market: Kina er ikke blot ét marked men mange forskellige markeder idet hver region er sit (specielle) marked. Kina er verdens største eksportør og verdens næststørste økonomi. Kina vil stå for 30 % af verdens GDP tilvækst i de kommende år. Kina har i øjeblikket en købestærk middelklasse på 100 mil. som vil stige til 300 mil. i løbet af de næste 3 år. Hvis man vil ind på det kinesiske marked skal man gøre sig klar om: o hvad det er for et marked man vil ind på o hvilket marked der er tilgængeligt for ens produkt/service o om man kan gøre forretning i det fundne markedssegment. New Competitors: De nuværende fire hovedforskelle imellem danske og kinesiske produkter/virksomheder og deres forudsagte udvikling er: o Kvalitetsgab (i dansk favør): Vil mindskes o Costgab (i kinesisk favør): Vil forsætte uforandret o Innovationsgab (i dansk favør): Vil mindskes o Beslutningstid (i kinesisk favør): Vil fortsætte uforandret A Rising Economic and Political Power: Kinas perspektiv på verden er, at de er i centrum og det er kun i en lille parentes i historien (de sidste 200 år), at de ikke har været det. De ser det som naturligt at skulle være i verdensøkonomiens førerposition Kinas udfordringer på kort bane er o Stigende produktionsomkostninger o Mulig boble i boligpriserne. World s Factory Hvis man ønsker at etablere sig som virksomhed i Kina skal man o Have det rigtige brand og/eller o Den rigtige teknologi og/eller o Low(est) cost product o Være til stede idet tingene udvikler sig så hurtigt at man blive nødt til at kunne beslutte på stedet og ikke vente på en beslutning fra et eventuelt dansk HQ. Således kan man ikke sende yngste mand ud til Kina. Den kinesiske ledelsesstil er meget top-down styring. 5

6 Hvad gjorde mest indtryk: Kina er ikke ét marked men mange. De enkelte provinser er i hård indbyrdes konkurrence og køber derfor hellere udenlandske dele end fra en anden provins. Staten (partiet) er involveret i mange virksomheder og derfor kan der skabes en meget svær konkurrencesituation. I Kina bliver der nødt til at tages meget hurtige beslutninger. o Man kan derfor ikke fastholde sin strategi for et år, men derimod være villig til at ændre strategi løbende. o Seniorerne bliver derfor udstationeret for de multinationale virksomheder, idet de kan tage beslutninger på stedet. Når Kina beslutter noget er der magt bag beslutningen, eks. etableringen af højhastighedstog på 7 8 år dækkende 80 % af hele Kinas befolkning. Der uddannes 6 mil. fra universiteterne hvert år og heraf er 2 mil. ingeniører. Kulturforskelle: Kineserne går udenom konfrontationer og benytter relationer, relationer, relationer. Kineserne tager deres forsørgerbyrde alvorligt: En medarbejder har hele sin familie som vedkommende skal forsørge. Læringspunkter: Kina er ikke ét marked. Beslutningskompetence skal være på stedet i Kina. Du er nødt til at tage stilling til Kina toget kører uanset om du er med eller ej. 6

7 China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) v/professor of Management Juan Antonio Fernandez Mandag d. 15. nov. Sted: Shanghai CEIBS står for China Europe International Business School og er i dag rangeret som den 22. bedste MBA-skole i verden. Fernandez gennemgik de særlige kendetegn ved kinesisk forretningskultur og kravene for at få succes i landet. Hans baggrund er en lang række forskningsresultater indenfor Store kinesiske statsejede virksomheder Multinationale selskaber i Kina Udenlandske iværksættere i Kina Kinesiske iværksættere I 2010 udgav CEIBS publikationen "2010 Doing Business in China: A survey of European Companies". Alle deltagere fik et eksemplar udleveret. Hans oplæg endte ud med 5 tips for succes i Kina: 1. Klar entry-strategi - hvad er din gevinst ved at gå ind i Kina og hvordan vil du opnå den? 2. Klar vækststrategi: Gradvis vækst giver mulighed for læring - men er ikke altid en mulighed 3. Værn om dine IPR - minimér risici for kopiering 4. HR: Hav fokus på træning 5. Leadership: Afgørende med dygtig og beslutningsdygtig lokal ledelse. Læringspunkter: Store kulturelle forskelle mellem Kina og vesten. I Kina er alt til forhandling også efter kontrakten er indgået. Også store forskelle internt i Kina mellem regioner, byer og indkomstgrupper. Kina er IKKE ET marked. Kina er meget decentralt - 70 pct. af det offentlige budget ligger decentralt. Vigtigt at "supporte" sin lokale ledelse Den største risiko: Ikke at investere i Kina. 7

8 Danisco (China) Holding Co. Ltd: Global og lokal salgsstrategi v/president Yongjing Li Mandag d. 15. nov. Sted: Shanghai Danisco China Facts: 900 employees in production, sales and R&D m2 production & R&D (Enzyme research center m2 Ingredients innovation center m2) Danisco in China started in 1930s, (from 1949 to beginning of 1990s not really active) 1996 Decision to build emulsifiers and functional systems factory, 2008 Danisco Shanghai Centre launched, 2009 Beijing culture plant launched. Danisco s decision to come back to China early 1990s was a good decision. If they should have entered today it would have been much more expensive. Was it early enough? Today Danisco has 7 legal units in China. Plants in China: Beijing plant (also BJ sales office), Anyang plant, Wuxi plant, Zhangjiagang plant, Kunshan plant, Innovation centre Genencor CRC (also SH sales office), GZ Sales office. Plant location: (1) closer to customers, (2) closer to raw materials (could also be close to harbour). Besides the plants and sales offices Financial Shared Service Centre + HR Centre for Asia Pacific is located in the Kunshan Plant and a strong innovation platform. R&D Reasons to move the innovation Danisco Strategic Centre in 2008 to Shanghai is primarily for two reasons: Closer to customers and the airport Centre for development able to attract high end research people Close contact and support to a number of universities The growing market Main focus for Danisco in China is: Brand (safety), Marketing (take it one step further), Know how (capability to innovate) they will not and cannot go into a price game Key customers: Coca Cola, Unilever, Lotte, KFC, etc. and a no. of local brands. A rising political and economic power Go west will involve 1-2 years training of employees and costly to transfer managers to the west in the future they will go west 8

9 Employer turnover rate is generally low with Danisco in the latest years between 1,4 (sales, marketing and R&D) and 8% 10,0% hourly workers. Of course it is about money try to keep a 70% quartile and but also the Danish work environment and business culture makes people feel safe, treat each other with respect and equally. Plus high level of internal communication Danisco China has achieved a no. of China government awards and has established a very good reputation in the industry and the local community. Active member in different societies Investing in tomorrow s customers through university programs and Danisco make a lot of patents and effort to defend them. New competitors GDP growth 8-9% p.a. China Food Industry growth 16-30% p.a. in the last 8 years, 5.8 Trnb even GDP/capita is still around USD What have we learned? Clear-cut business strategy for China for the whole value-chain (R&D, Marketing, Production and shared services). Separate strategies for homeland market and export Be firm and stable but flexible Today Denmark cannot substitute China and China cannot substitute Denmark we have to work together What was most impressive? Strong focus in China on Business opportunities also in the long run, i.e. accept loses in the short run in Bakery-business, but expects it to be growing within next 5 years. Danish and Chinese business culture has some similarities, i.e. being humble and not talkative, which is a benefit. However, also illustrate the paradox of being firm, persistent and stable in a business environment where the business needs to be flexible and maintain the ability to make swift business decisions. 9

10 Danfoss Shanghai Automatic controls Co. Ltd: Strategier for Kina v/director Business Service Michael Chang in Danfoss since 1995 Mandag d. 15. nov. Sted: Radisson Shanghai The Growing Market: For the Chinese it is difficult to understand the crises which Europe + USA have experienced since mid 2008 due to a steady growth in China for the same period (aprox. 10% per year). Danfoss expects a growth of 45% in 2010 for external sales in the Chinese market. 250 sales engineers out of employees in China. 70% south of Tianjin and 30% North of Tianjin Development for Danfoss journey toward being second home market position: 2006: 6 th biggest home market th biggest home market rd biggest home market The focus on sales and growth in Russia, Brasil, India and China has been a direct driver for Danfoss coming out of the financial crises. Where is Danfoss China on the journey toward second home market position: Getting started (first 5 years): Started with a sales office in Hongkong with 25 employees Started in a leased building Learning how to do business in China Gaining first manufacturing and sourcing experiences Building sales competences Getting serious (next 5 years): Now major investments Large scale manufacturing Growing sales force and market coverage Establishing position in premium segment Brand building Gaining product development experience Growing via acquisitions Growth for sustainability : Double group turnover in 2015 Product development for China in China. Develop route to market for the mid-segment Bring local sourcing of parts to next level Implement local sourcing of machinery Lower the manufacturing cost base Develop local management talent Getting position in mid segment 10

11 Would like to recruit 100 R&D people today if he they could New Competitors For Danfoss China the main competitors are local Chinese producers. Danfoss recruited 6 employees in Nordborg with focus on protection of IPR, copy of trademarks and registration of trade marks. World s Factory Danfoss main focus in the coming year will be on energy and environment Danfoss will focus their 5 year strategy on go west in China due to lower cost base and a rising mid market in this area. Biggest impressions: Even though the growth and changes in China are very fast, Danfoss has used quite a long time and still are on translating and implementing the Group strategy of Danfoss for the Chinese employees due to cultural differences. E.g. it is still emphasized for all new employees that Danfoss is a family owned 2 nd generation company. It is very difficult to recruit educated employees with 5-6 years experience and right now Danfoss would hire 100 R&D employees tomorrow if they could find them. Typically the Chinese well educated employee prefers to work in the bigger cities. The carrot is access to latest technology and a stay in Denmark at Danfoss in Nordborg. Low quality product according to European standard could be world class in China. Learning points: Danfoss in China made a loss in the first 5 years, which are quite normal for foreign companies Typical implementation curve for entering the Chinese market since 2000: 75% Danfoss and 25% government own company Acquisition of 100% private owned Chinese companies, appr. one per year with establishment of own production. Joint ventures with competitor for simple product to still have a part of the market 50/50 % technology joint ventures with competitor to secure being a partner in the new innovation pipe line of products and securing high quality and protection of IPR. Holip stays Holip 100% developed product in China For the acquisitions it typically takes a couple of years to fase out the family involvement in the family owned Chinese companies, which are incorporated in the Danfoss Group. 11

12 Perspectives related to own organizations: Adapt your product to the Chinese market most likely a much lower cost and lower quality version. Consider double branding. Down scale own brand by local sourcing of resources Target should be mid segment and focus on Just good enough market. Be sure to protect IPR Chinese market will continue to show strong and sustainable growth Increased focus on better quality of life Alignment of IT systems, procedures and documentation is very difficult in a high growth market. Foss Scino (Suzhou) Co. Ldt: Konkurrenter I Kina og global? v/general Manager Rikard Hesslevik Tirsdag d. 16. nov. Sted: Suzhou Background: Foss Analytical Instruments established themselves in China in 2008, but has been doing business with China for more than 30 years. Today Foss has 30 R&D-staff in Suzhou, expected to rise to 40 in Vision for China: - New entry level brand (2. tier) - Production platform for sourcing and maintenance - Start up of R&D center (2009) Started up as a WFOE. Started up with an older product, adapted to local suppliers and with certain automation parts removed. The product was characterized by the same quality/safety but shorter life cycle. The entry level product is called SCINO TM. Much to Foss surprise, their products had no Brand Value in China. The distribution network for the original Foss products was not used for the entry level product for the reason to limit cannibalization on the premium brand. A separate distribution network for Foss Scino was needed. 12

13 The Growing Market: Challenges: Find the right low-cost sales organisation. Distributors/agents control their market Low margin sales requires much higher volume than natural for Foss Local competitors are very reluctant to invest in anything more than necessary ( Good Enough Quality ) New Competitors: There are copies on the market, but that doesn t present a large problem Foss thought they had a Brand Value advantage, but that wasn t the case Competition from local brands is fierce Core components and knowledge is kept out of China (fx. NIR and SW) because of o Risk of copying o Lack of local knowledge A Rising Economic and Political Power: World s Factory It takes about 5 months to localize sourcing of an instrument to China. Staff: o 75, of whom 20 women and 55 men o Average age 30 o Average monthly salary RMB (13 months/year) o Difference between high and low salary is a factor 10 o Work week 40 hours, 8:30-17:00 o 5 sick days a year paid o 5-10 holidays a year dependent on seniority o Staff turnover is 20 % among blue collar always looking for better wages o Turnover for engineers somewhat less o Contracts committing staff for 2-3 years. If they leave before that, they have to pay back the company s expenses in training them o Engineers are hired directly out of university and then trained by the company o Top level talent is difficult to attract. Candidates are screened and tested carefully. Many potential candidates oversell themselves o New senior engineers are posted in Denmark for a couple of weeks to get to know the organization Typical numbers when moving production to China o 40 % reduction of cost price o 85 % of components are sourced o 50 % cost reduction on components Industrial buildings are of very low quality 13

14 What made the most impact on you?: Tempo is extremely high in China. For example, if you want to book a meeting 3 months ahead, you are met with disbelief: In three months time, things can have changed many times.. Learning points: Long term planning is difficult at the rate of development in China It s possible to attract engineers to Suzhou because of lower cost of living compared to Shanghai. Foss is targeting very young engineers, because they are easier to mould and they don t carry the older culture If you have the right man it s possible to start almost from scratch and get somewhere Foss has come far in just two years as an independent company in China Nilfisk Advance: Produktion til det lokale marked eller globale? v/regional Director Asia Jens C. Skovrup og General Manager Mikkel Johansen Tirsdag d. 16. nov. Sted: Suzhou Market Nilfisk Advance China: 2% of world market; 10% of market in China. 210 employees in the China sales organization Move with industry West 42% organic growth in 2009, 2010 (49% in 2011) Middleclass growth huge potential for use of Nilfisk products Strong industry growth in South America, East Europe and Asia. Cost based movement of production (Mexico, Hungary and Asia) Product Company sales to mother company who then sell to Customer Company. History 2003: Suzhou Manufacturing 2004 Ningbo via acquisition of Alto 2007 Acquisition of Viber 2008: Suzhou R&D center (global strategy) 14

15 R&D: Start up: 10 employees Not high-end in China this stays in Denmark Reference to Group R&D Head. Production: Global premium brand Prod cost savings Supplier access Local R&D access (global teams low cost R&D) Close to largest future market Suzhou Production (Europe and Asia) Strategy: Global production, Medium / Low complexity & High volume ( ) otherwise as expensive as in Europe m2, production machines/year in a pure assembly production set-up. 270 employees (hereof 177 in operations). Very flat organization (small hierarchy) giving the challenge that promotion is difficult. Not a typical Chinese-management team are able to work independently, has been a long process with the aim to enable the individuals to take responsibility. About 40% savings (IPO & OH) + Material Saving. Viber brand: Low cost brand separated in the whole value chain from production to sales. Employees Global ethics, UN etc. Pressure to keep the law Chinese Labour Law: Social security, overtime pay. White collar: General more established, decreasing turnover (all have cars, parking is a problem), Sale people turnover rate 36 % Blue collar: Turnover rate of 50% very problematic difficult even to train. Lowest operator cost 1500 RMB/month + bonus (20%) + social cost. 15

16 Professional Staff: Similar cost as in Denmark (at higher management level). IPR Machines are copied but today faster development, which means copy-pirates have les less time to copy Nilfisk products + Service organization, is better. Chinese used to that local cheats and then do not prefer local Chinese products. BUT: need keep up with local competitors (access to capital, improve quality, improve service. Impressive: 100% LEAN production Keep no. Empl low expecting minimum salary to double within 5 years Do not micro-cost 16

17 Royal Danish Consulate Chongqing: Go west strategy on Chongqing v/consul, Trade Commissioner Hans Halskov Onsdag d. 17. nov. Sted: Chongqing Hans Halskov redegjorde for konsulatets tilstedeværelse i Chongqing, som er Kinas største bystyre (municipality) direkte underlagt centralregeringen i Beijing. Chongqings geografiske område er ca. dobbelt så stort som Danmark, og befolkningen er på 31,4 mio. mennesker. Væksten i BNP var i 2009 på 14,2 % - verdens og Kinas 3. højeste. Hans Halskovs præsentation indeholdt bl.a. følgende punkter, som er værd at have med i overvejelserne ved etablering eller ekspansion i Kina: Sats lokalt i Kina hold fokus, og gå videre skridt for skridt. Nødvendigt med en strategisk horisont på 5-10 år. Relationsopbygning er enormt vigtigt på alle niveauer. Overvej om etablering på østkysten er det rigtige. Generel trend at virksomhederne flytter mod vest-kina. Etablering i vest-kina giver bedre muligheder for at blive hørt ift. myndighederne. Etablering i vest-kina betyder ca. 30 % lavere omkostninger ift. etablering på østkysten. Klassificering som high tech virksomhed = 10 % skat ellers 25 % Generalkonsulatet har særdeles god kontakt til myndighederne i Chongqing. Mulighed for at få en såkaldt virtual medarbejder tilknyttet ens egen virksomhed gennem konsulatet dkk / år for en halvtidsmedarbejder. Vigtigt at virksomheden hurtigt selv overtager. (anbefalet efter max. et år) Mulighed for at leje et kontor på konsulatet for egen ansat medarbejder i op til et år ordningen hedder Incubator mere information kan findes på hjemmesiden nævnt nedenfor For yderligere info. vedr. Incubaor samt øvrige ydelser som konsulatet kan tilbyde se vedhæftede. Kontaktdata: Royal Danish Consulate Metropolitan Tower 31 / F #1 68 Zourong Road Central District Chongqing Tlf.: Fax: ckghkt@um.dk Hjemmeside: 17

18 kk-qianwei: Kinesisk dansk joint venture v/vice President, China Operations Jørgen Berg Tolstoy Onsdag d. 17. nov. Sted: Chongqing Summary KK Electronics A/S is the largest independent supplier of offshore control systems in the world. They are a Pioneer in modern Wind industry have successfully delivered WTC systems for more than wind turbines both on as offshore. KK Electronics A/S has production sites in Denmark and Poland and the joint venture in China. Huge market for turbines in China hence selling opportunities. KK Electronics A/S has used a Joint venture with CSIC/Qianwei as entry strategy to the Chinese market. CSIC/Qianwei is owned by The Republic of China and it was important to have a local partner, because things change overnight in China (political). KK Qianwei has a Chinese General Manager and Jørgen Berg Tolstoy has a role as supervisor with no direct power. Business in China is build on long term relations and everything is negotiable money talks. The market for wind turbines is scattered across the country. 145 employees next year. The Local Government expects that the company will hire more when you have growth. (Pressure because of cheap taxes, etc. but no actual demand) - It is difficult to fire people in China - once you have been supported. No direct dialogue with local government - it is the local GM - because they may have promised something. - About relationships. Aims to sell complete systems including monitoring. KK has worked extensively with Chinese subcontractors - not necessarily cheaper in all cases. Entry barriers for late comers to the market. The government Encourage consolidation of existing players. R&D of the employees works with assessment of applications. No core R&D in China. Is it at success moderate up to now however good perspectives penetration takes time in China Learning points Business in China is build on long term relations Everything is negotiable money talks. Keep IPR s indoor Important to have a local impact of government. Important to have Danish staff on site either permanent or on off in longer periods 18

19 City planning Museum: Infrastructure in Chongqing Onsdag d. 17. nov. Sted: Chongqing Background: Besøg på Chongqings Urban Planning Exhibition Hall. Museet var delvist lukket, men hovedattraktionen, en skala 1:750 model af Chongqing, som byen forventes at udvikle sig til i 2020, var tilgængelig. En engelsktalende museumsguide fortalte om byen. The Growing Market: Chongqing er et Municipality (kommune) med o Rivende udvikling på % økonomisk vækst per år, sammenholdt med ca. 10 % for Kina som helhed o Kommunen dækker kv.km. (2 x Danmarks areal) o Stor grad af urbanisering, 50 %, stigende til 70 % i 2020 o 32 mio. mennesker, hvoraf 6½ mio. bor i selve Chongqing by o udlændinge (heraf 12 danskere!) o Fem forskellige bycentre (Central Business Districts), med hvert sit fokusområde 19

20 A Rising Economic and Political Power: Årsagen til Chongqings hurtige vækst er o Kinas Go West politik o Chongqings status som Kinas 4. City Municipality betyder direkte reference til statsmagten, hvilket gør beslutningshierarkiet langt mere effektivt o De stigende lønninger på østkysten (Shanghai og Beijing) o En lavere virksomhedsskat på 10 %, mod 25 % i Shanghai World s Factory Chongqings arbejdskraft er o Præget af bønder som trækker ind til byen o Dårligt eller slet ikke uddannet Industrierne er o Tung industri, herunder transportmidler. Kemisk og farmaceutisk industri. o I fremtiden forventes endvidere flere high-tech industrier (elektronik, bio- og miljøteknologi) Hvad gjorde mest indtryk: Urban Planning Exhibition Hall efterlod samme indtryk som byen i øvrigt: Det var ved at blive udvidet, mens vi besøgte det. En byggeplads, der illustrerer den kolossale og konsekvente udvikling, der finder sted i Chongqing. 20