- d &S Haskov, Saren Sendt: 25. februar 2003 05:48 Ti: UM - Komcenter (t) Cc: misekafe-mai-dk; fe@fe-mai.dk; FMN - Comcen; Officia Maibox, Ankara Embassy; Officia Maibox, Beijing Embassy; Officia Maibox, Cairo Embassy; Officia Maibox, Damascus Embassy; Officia Maibox, Geneva FN Mission; Officia Maibox, Haag Em bassy; Officia Maibox, samabad Em bassy; Officia Maibox, London Em bassy; Officia Maibox, Madrid Embassy; Officia Maibox, Mexico Embassy; Officia Maibox, Moscow Embassy; Officia Maibox, Oso Embassy; Officia Maibox, Ottawa Embassy; Officia Maibox, Paris Embassy; Officia Maibox, Riyadh Embassy; Officia Maibox, Santiago Embassy; Officia Maibox, Sofia Embassy; Officia Maibox, Stockhom Embassy; Officia Maibox, Tehran Embassy; Officia Maibox, Te Aviv Embassy; Officia Maibox, Vienna Embassy; Officia Maibox, Warsaw Embassy; Officia Maibox, Washington Em bassy; Officie Maibox, Berin Ambassade; Officie Maibox, Brysse DANATO; Officie Maibox, EU Repræsentationen; stm @stm.dk; aki@fmn.dk; Braad, Michae; Christensen, Berte Dons; Christensen, Jan Top; Christensen, Tomas Anker; Christiansen, Thure; Faaborg-Andersen, Lars; Stender, Femming; Geean, Kirsten; Hahn, Henrik Bramsen; Hansen, Peter Lyshot; Hansen, Tina Aice; Hjorts~, Michae Just; Hom, Kavs A.; Horsund, Jens Otto; J~rgensen, Vibeke Rovsing (NY); Lassen, Christina Markus; Lauridsen, Morten Lykke; Laj, Een Margrethe; Lund-Sarensen, Thomas; Michesen, Jette; Moesby, Oe; Mosgaard, Kurt; N-SP; N.USA; Osen, Kasper Thams; Panck, Nikas; Riisgaard, Louise; S.FN; S.HUM; S.MELA; Shine, Susanne; Siasen, Grete; S~ndergaard, Carsten; Staur, Carsten; Svensson, Nikoaj; Szczepanski, Pia Starbæk; Thygesen, Trine Rask; Uerup, Ove; Knudsen, Urik Vestergaard; W~ggsborg, Nies Henrik; Zimer-Johns, Michae; Damsgaard, Anders Carsten; Ministersekretariatet; Vagthavende; Shine, Susanne; NYCMSU, Archive; J~rgensen, Vibeke Rovsing (NY) Emne: FN-Mis. New York MS202 - rak. Sikkerhedsrådet. Resoutionsudkast og memorandum. AD ACTA: Attention: DeskBy: Forme E-post: Journanr: Kassifikation: Personae indkades: NYCMS (t), Archive S.MELA og N.SP 8.00 Ja 5.E.rak UKLASSFCERET Nej! Ti: Udenrigsministeriet;misek@fe-mai.dk;fe@f - Comcen;Officia Maibox, Ankara Embassy;Officia Maibox, Beijing Embassy;Officia Maibox, Cairo Embassy;Officia Maibox, Damascus Embassy;Officia Maibox, Geneva FN Mission;Officia Maibox, Haag Embassy;Officia Maibox, samabad Embassy;Officia Maibox, London Embassy;Officia Maibox, Madrid Embassy;Officia Maibox, Mexico Embassy;Officia Maibox, Moscow Embassy;Officia Maibox, Oso Embassy;Officia Maibox, Ottawa Embassy;Officia Maibox, Paris Embassy;Officia Maibox, Riyadh Embassy;Officia Maibox, Santiago Embassy;Officia Maibox, Sofia Embassy;Officia Maibox, Stockhom Embassy;Officia Maibox, Tehran Embassy;Officia Maibox, Te1 Aviv Embassy;Officia Maibox, Vienna Embassy;Officia Maibox, Warsaw Embassy;Officia Maibox, Washington Embassy;Officie Maibox, Berin Ambassade;Officie Maibox, Brysse DANAT0;Officie Maibox, EU Repr~sentationen;stm@stm.dk;aki@fmn.dk;Braad, Michae;Christensen, Berte Dons;Christensen, Jan Top;Christensen, Tomas Anker;Christiansen, Thure;Faaborg-Andersen, Lars;Stender, Femming;Geean, Cirsten;Hahn, Henrik Bramsen;Hansen, Peter Lyshot;Hansen, Tina Aice;Hjorts@, Michae Just;Hom, Kavs A.;Horsund, Jens Otto;Jorgensen, Vibeke Rovsing (NY);Lassen, Christina Markus;Lauridsen, Morten Lykke;Loj, Een Margrethe;Lund-Sorensen, Thomas;Michesen, Jette;Moesby, Oe;Mosgaard, Kurt;N.SP;N.USA;Osen, Kasper Thams;Panck, Nikas;Rusgaard, Louise;S.FN;S.HUM;S.MELA;Shine, Susanne;Siasen, Grete;S~ndergaard, Carsten;Staur, Carsten;Svensson, Nikoaj;Szczepanski, Pia Starb~k;Thygesen, Trine Rask;Uerup, Ove;(nudsen, Urik Vestergaard;Waggsborg, Nies Henrik;Zimer-Johns, Michae;Darnsgaard, Anders
Cars ten;ministersekretariatet;vagthavende;shne Susanne FN-Missionen New York E-post MS202 af 24. februar 2003 23:48:00 Desk By: 8.00 rak. Sikkerhedsrådet. Resoutionsudkast og memorandum. Sammenfatning: * Amerikansk-britisk-spansk resoutionsudkast fremagt. Fastsår, at rak ikke har udnyttet den sidste chance, man fik med resoution 1441, for at nedruste. 2-3 ugers forhandinger forventes. Forsagsstierne indikeret, at man ikke er rede ti1 at foretage starre zndringer i teksten. - * Fransk - russisk - tysk memorandum om forstzrkede inspektioner og kar tidspan for gennemfarese af udestående nedrustningsopgaver. Statte fra Kina. ik Afventende reaktioner under ukkede konsutationer. Udmedinger forventes farst i forbindese med nzste konsutationer, Sandsynigvis på torsdag. * UNMOVC krzvet, at dqstruktion af A Samoud 2-missierne påbegyndes 1. marts. 1. Udkast ti resoution under ukkede konsutationer prxsenterede UK på vegne af USA 'og Spanien vedh~ftede resoution. Forsagsstderne fremsatte samtidig hermed officiet resoutionen. Man forventer at genoptage ukkede konsutationer om resoutionen - og nedenstående memorandum - senere på ugen, sandsynigvis torsdag d. 27. februar. Vedhzftet er også den britiske ambassadars taepunkter, som er offentiggjort. Han gentog synspunkter om raks mangende samarbejde, herunder at rak ikke siden inspektionernes genoptagese havde vzret i stand ti at afkare et eneste substantiet punkt. Den umiddebare baggrund og forventede videre procedure fremkommer i de tre sidste afsnit i taepunktet. UK håbede gennem resoutionen at fasthode Sikkerhedsrådets kontro med processen og skabe konsensus om, at rak havde vagt ikke at udnytte den sidste chance for en fredeig nedrustning. Men der var stadig tid for rak ti at vzge rigugt. Man onskede såedes ikke afstemning med det samme. Der skue vzre tid ti at drafte udkastet. På den anden side var det ikke hodningen bandt forsagsstierne, at der skue ske substantiee zndringer ti resoutionen, hvorfor man også havde vagt at fremzgge den officiet med det samme. En konfikt kunne stadig undgås, hvis Sikkerhedsrådet gjorde det kart for rak, hvad konsekvenserne af raks hidtidige forkerte vag vie vzre. [Bemzrkning: Tidigere på dagen opyste Missionens britiske samtaepartner, at der endnu ikke var truffet besutning om, hvorvidt resoutionsudkastet formet skue fremzgges. Vurderingen er, at fremzggesen af nedenstående memorandum har haft en indvirkning herpå.] Efter konsutationerne anfarte den britiske ambassadar over for pressen, at resoution 1441 ikke fordrede en ny resoution, men det przsenterede resoutionsudkast vie vzre et stzrkt poitisk signa om, at FN stod sammen bag kravet om, at rak skue afrustes. Derudover vie resoutionsudkastet vie bidrage ti1 at fokusere Sikkerhedsrådets draftese. Som det fremgir, indehoder resoutionen kun to operative paragraffer, hvoraf operative paragraf 2 (" Remain seized...") er en standardparagraf. operative paragraf 1 fastsår Sikkerhedsrådet, at rak har
forspidt den sidste chance, som man fik ved resoution 1441. Argumentationen herfor prsesenteres i den prseambusere de, i sserdeeshed i paragraf 3: "Recakng that its resoution 1441 (2002) whie deciding that raq has been and remains in materia breach of its obigations, afforded raq a fina opportunity to compy with its disarmament obigations under reevant resoutions". Det gzder generet for den prseambuzre de, at det i at overvejende grad er tae om formueringer hentet fra resoution 1441 - formueringer, der som bekendt bev vedtaget med konsensus. Men det bar bemserkes, at man i resoutionsudkastet ikke har medtaget formueringer, der henviser ti inspektionerne. (Eksempevis bygger przarnbuzre paragraf 3 på formueringer fra operative paragraffer 1 og 2 i 1441, men udeader anden de af operative paragraf 2 vedrarende etaberingen af et udvidet inspektionsregime. Prseambusere paragraf 4 bygger på operative paragraf 4 og derved også på paragrafferne 11 og 12, som foreskriver, at det er UNMOVC og AEA, der ska rapportere om raks, mangende samarbejde, på hviket baggrund Rådet ska agere). 2. Memorandum om inspektioner Frankrig har - i samarbejde med Tyskand - i den forgangne weekend udarbejdet vedhzftede memorandum vedrarende fredeig nedrustning gennem inspektioner. Det bev przsenteret af den franske ambassadar under de ukkede konsutationer på vegne af Rusand og Tyskand. Kina udtrykte statte ti1 papiret, jf. nedenfor. Tyskand przciserede under art. '19- konsutationer i EU-kredsen, at man havde vagt memorandummodeen, fordi der ikke var behov for yderigere resoutioner. Papiret å inden for rammerne af resoution 1441. Den tyske ambassadar gik et skridt videre i et interview med pressen og fastsog, at det å i forzngese af EU7s erksering, som ae EU-ande jo stod bag!. (Bemzr&ng: Det var vurderingen, hos fere samtaepartnere, at indhodet i papiret hurtigt kunne omformes ti1 en resoution, hvis der måtte vise sig behov for en "konklrrerende" resoution). ' Memorandummet fastsår som udgangspunkt, at betingeserne for magtanvendese ikke er ti stede, idet 1) der er intet bevis for, at rak har masseadeseggesesvåben eer kapacitet ti at udvike dem; 2) inspektionerne fungerer farst nu i fudt omfang; 3) raks samarbejde er under forbedring ("is improving") Det understreges, at et enigt Sikkerhedsråd og et aget pres på rak er vzsentige betingeser for at opnå en fredeig asning. Herefter opstier papiret en fremgangsmåde for at sikre en verificerbar, fredeig nedrustning af rak: * UNMOWC og AEA ska udarbejde program for de udestående nedrustningsopgaver i prioriteret rsekkefage og med kare kriterier for, hvoredes raks efterevese kan verificeres. * Forbedrede inspektioner, jf. eksempevis franske non-paper. * Der ska opsties reaistiske og stramme tidsfrister: - inspekt~rerne ska senest 1. marts 2003 fremzgge arbejdsprogram for vzsentigste nedrustningsopgaver; - inspektarerne ska rapportere på regemassig basis - hver 3. uge - om gennemf~resen af programmet; - UNMOVC og AEA ska i henhod ti1 resoution 1284 ave fremskridtsrapport 120 dage efter vedtagesen af arbejdsprograrnmet; (bemarkning: under EU-koordinationen kunne forsagsstierne ikke skabe karhed over, hviken 120 dages frist der henvistes ti1 i 1284 ); 3
- at Bix og EBaradei straks ska rapportere ti1 Sikkerhedsrådet, hvis rak enten griber ind i inspektionerne eer ikke opfjdder sine nedrustningsforpigteser; - supperende mader i Sikkerhedsrådet, evt. på hajt niveau, kan indkades når som hest. 3. Konsutationerne og den videre procedure Under de ukkede konsutationer fremkom der ikke nye standpunkter hos de vagte medemmer. kke overraskende indtog de feste en afventende hodning - "we wi smdy both documents before next meeting..". Kina udtrykte statte ti1 memorandummet. Der var stadig tid ti en fredeig asning. Udgangspunktet måtte vzre at sikre en humanitzr asning. Det var przmaturt at tae om en endeig asning. nspektarerne var netop begyqdt at opnå resutater. Rusand fastsog, at der ikke var behov for en ny resoution. Man afkiste formueringen i resoutionsudkastets przambuzre paragiaf 6 om, at raks erkarring indehodt faske opysninger. Det var ikke bevist af inspektarerne. Resoution 1441 - og inspektionerne - virkede efter hensigten, hvis det var nedrustning, der var m'åsztningen. Hvis måsztningen var regimeskifte, forhodt sagen sig naturigvis anderedes. b Under konsutationerne havde der vzret en vis diskussion af rapporteringsfrister. Der var utifredshed med, at 7. marts figurerede som en dato, eftersom inspektarerne havde frem ti 27. marts ti at afzgge rapport om vzsentigste udestående nedrustningsopgaver. Dette måtte vzre op ti inspektarerne at fastså, om sidstnzvnte rapportering kunne fremrykkes. (Der synes at vzre en vis forvirring om rapporteringsfristerne. henhod ti 1284 ska inspektarerne pr. 1. marts ave en kvartasmsessig statusrapport samt senest p.' 27. marts fremzgge en oversigt over "key remaining disarmement tasks"). For indevzrende synes aene de genoptagne konsutationer på torsdag d. 27. februar at igge fast. Fastzggesen af tidspunkterne for UNMOVC/AEA's rapportering forventes tidigst at ske i begyndesen af naste uge, hvor Guinea har overtaget formandskabet for Sikkerhedsrådet. For så vidt angår afstemning om resoutionsudkastet er vurderingen, at forsagsstierne opererer med en tidsramme på 2-3 uger. 4. Destruktion af A Samoud 2 missier mv. Vedhzftet fremsendes det i pressen omtate brev af 21. februar 2003 fra Bix ti Dr. A Sa'adi, rak, om skrotning af missier. Det fremgår heraf, at rak ska forezgge UNMOVC bevis for, at ae A Samoud 2 missier samt reaterede komponenter er bevet destrueret. Destruktionen, som ska udfares af rak under UNMOVCs tisyn, ska vzre påbegyndt senest den 1. marts 2003. (The appropriate arrangements shoud be made so that the destruction process can commence by 1 March 2003.) Greenstocks Memorandum (rak RAK Brev fra Bix 210203.pdf stemmigt konkuderede, at missierne har en stmre r~kkevidde, end den i resoution 687 tiadte, jf. mismai 0159 af 14. februar 2003. Endvidere krzver UNMOVC destruktion af de
genopbyggede stabehaer, som vi kunne producere motorer ti missier med en rzekkevidde på mere end 150 km., Yderigere tekniske opysninger og undersageser udestår, far UNMOVC kan trzffe besutning'om, hvorvidt A Fatah rnissisystemet også udgm et brud på resoutionerne. Det bemxrkes, at den franske ambassadar ti1 pressen efter dagens konkusioner sog fast, at fristen i Bix' skrivese og destruktionen var obigatorisk for rak. Adspurgt af pressen om Husseins udtaeser under et interview med CBS skue have udtat, at rak ikke vie destruere rnissierne svarede den britiske ambassadar, at han stxrkt vde opfordre rak ti at eftereve fristen i Bix' brev. Vibeke Rovsing Jargensen/Een Margrethe Laj <<Greenstocks prmentation 240203.pdf>> <<Memorandum (rak 24 FEB 2003).pdf>> <<RAK, (US-UK-SPANSK DRAFT 24 FEB 2003).pdf>> <<Brev fra Bix 210203.pdf>> FN-Missionen New York MS202
raq: Presentatbn of UWU CSpanish Draft Securiqr Councii R By Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK Permnent ReprasenUWe, Couna bnsuttations, 24 February 2003, - shouid ike to expain cerefuy to Counci coeagues why Viis text is being tabed at this time and in this fom, and what actbnwe are then proposing. - The CO-Sponsors are convinoed thdt t-aq is not achieving. nor intending to achieve, the objective o SCR 1441. 1441 set out that obj8ctive in s W and wmpeing tema: (OPZ) "bringing to fu1 and verified the disamament p abished by SCR 687". 1441 attractsd ward a just because of ts atter and the ss which ed to its adoptiorr, but because its unani message represented a powerfu signa that the UN was in controi. The S nci was chaenged by the U President to rase ics game on its most difficutt agenda item: and, by adopting 1441, it dm so. The Resoution set out the most stringent temis ever decided upon by ttie United Nations for the proces8 of disarmarnent. But them was aso an dive branch in 1441 : raq was given @very.incentive to rspair its documented non-compiancs. - Today, 15 weeks on from 1441, we are no further advanced toymrds that objedive of oompete disamment. ndeed, nor is raq taking adequate steps to corred its wider breaches of 687, incuding its continued support for terrorism. The terms of Resoution 1441 are not being respe, and in parts af the current debate not evm being re mem be red. - 1441 depored 'raq's past aviour. What we a asksd of raq was, firs4 a marked change from its denia and deception of 1091 to 2002, which had aready paced B in matetia breach of reevant resoutions; and second, fu1 compiance with and moperation w$h the irnpementation 01 1441. n other words, a decision by raq, visiby and unrnstakabty. to dhrest d Weapons of Mass Desruction imrnedbtey, unwndbnay and acthiey. That means bringing prosaibed materia8 or pmgramrnes to the notie a inspecton and providing a fu! and credibe account of raq's WMD adbity backed up by dwurnentary evidenw and testimony from personne. - What 1441 was not was the estabishment o a detective or a containment exercise. Again, the objecti've was to bring disamament to 'wmpetion' fied of WMD are instruments for the effedive deivery end ve disarmarnent. This has ben #e ase sincs 1991. SCR 687 deda re the ocation, amounts and types of proscribed items. raq was asked to yiem possession of them to UN inspectors tor destrudon, remova or rendering harmess. This time, 12 years on, mere eaw be ris rebeat into procrastination or parii resuh. The fina opportunity atorded in SCR 1411 was not for ihe Counu to side bad< into SS, but for imq to remgnise e new dekmination in the Securiy Cound to compete the business in a way whch represented a compete change of attitude in BagMaB. n of that compete
- That has not happened. Let me sey why we at8 convind that raq has decided to mmáin in defiancs of the UN: - Firs$, ook at the immediste m-up to ths return af inspedom. n 2002, raq began seriousy to dis~cs the issue of inspectbns ony when it reaised that we, as tha internationa cornmunity, mud nat give up on mpete disarmament. For months. raq sought to haggk with the Couna, to set preconditions (the '19 questiansn), and to negotiate away its non nce of the past. raq ony ag four days after President Bush's s af 12 September in a cynica attempt to any new resoution strengthening aem. - Second. we hoped - certafny the United Kingdom hoped - that the adoption of 4441 wouid see a change af heart by the raqi regime. raq's 13 November etter foowing the adoption of 1441, fu1 of tirades and compaints. and grudgingy a pung mat mud 'dea with" the resoution, was w ort of the whoehearted cumm*rtment to vountary disarrnament we had hoped for. internationa aw underiined this. r 23 November etter on how 1441 "~ntradicts' Then Game the responses to the detaed requitements of 1441 - raq has produced a 12,000 page decaration that is indisputaby inadequate. Dr Bix caed 'rich in voume but poor in new information... and pradicay devoid d new evidente"; - raq has done evetything possibe to prevent unrestricted nterviews. withwt raqi minders. eavesdropping, or intimidation of potentia intervie. UNMOVC has so far been abk to oonduct ony hree private interview - a of which took pace with peope vounteered by the iraqis and a of which tmk pace in #e irnmediate runup to Dr Bix's ast visit to Baghdad. Since then nothing; ' - raq has dragged b feet on as many other eernents of p ura mperatk>n as possibe. nstead of serious maboration wiv, the inspectors, raq has tried to make the proces into a ighuy monitored media drcus. with demonstraton ready to herass inspectors if they come too cose to hidden materia. As Dr BU! toid the Counci on 27 Jsnuary, 'Demonstrations and outbursts... are unikeiy to occur without initiativ8 or enmuragement from the avthorities. We must ask ourseves what the motives may be for these eventsw; - raq's CO-operation on substanw has been non-existent. Since ins s resumed UNMOVC have not been ame to cose a singe outstanding issue. We not knw what happened to 8,500 itres of anairax, 2.160 kiograms of bacteria growth media. 360 tonnes of buk chernica warfare agent. 3.000 tonner of precursor chemicas. 1.5 tonnes o! VX neme agent, and 6,SM aemia bmbs- ve never had satisfadory answem about the entire scape of raq's BW programme. tkre are now even more unresoved questions: for exarnpe, why has raq deveoped a prohibited missie programme and why has it refurbished equiprnent - rocket easttng chambers and chernica processors - destroyed Dy UNSCOM? Does this show anything other than
cear jntent to restart prohibited programmes? nstead of providing fu] dommentation. induding admnistratve documente reating to personnei and funding. raq has providd substantivs new sviden-. t has sattered its documents into private huses and vehides to hide the scope of its programmes and to provide a basis for extending them Men the pressure is off. And it has n pubic pretended that Mre are no wbtanding issues, even though many uf these have been we known for years. - Ths continues the 12-year pattem o raq seeking to deceve the Councii: an a tac farniiar pattem of raq wing to get us to focus m sma1 concessions d prucess. rather than on the bi$ picture. The cerdina point is ttat there is no sernbance sf peration; nothing ike vountary end active disarmament; nothing ike a regime with nothing to hide; nothing ike the South Africa mode referred to by Dr Bx. - Tb8 United Kingdom, Virough tabing this drar in thi$ form. see<j b keep the h und in oonfro of the p s and t6 buid renewed nci consensus, as on 8 Nmmber, that raq has ma wrong *i=: Vf3 ChO to take, at ast. the fina opportun@ vouniariy to disam in ance with UN resoutions. We shai, in detaied discussion, set out fu argument that ce has been made, that the chok is a defiance of 1441,and that the avaiabe r are fast disappearing. - But we are not asking for any instant judgernents. This h e seriws subjed. and the stakes are significant There is time sti: under pressure from the Councii, for raq to make the riqfd choice. We sha not ca for a vote on this text unti a proper debate has been hed, and we ar9 ready for the propositbns in the text b be fuy exarnined. t s not our intention ihat the text shoud &enge in any great degree: and that is why we are asking for it to be put into Mue now. But we do want further time for fu1 diswssion. - There is sti an oppominiy to avert confiii. But the Counc's judgement that raq has made the wrong choice shoud be dear and consensua. The ad chance for peece k that Uie Couna shouk say this together and formay. confront Baghded with the stak impications. and trust that, in these fina weeks, the responsc wi be the mmpete dsarmarnent which we demended - 14 iesoutionr ago - in SCR 087. on 8 Apri 1991.
MSON Memorandum 1. Fu1 and effeetivc disarmament in accordanee with tbe rdevint WSC reroutions remains the imperative objectivc of the internationa community. Our pnonty oboud be to ichicvt air peacefuy tbrough thc inspection regimc The miihry option shoud ony be a ast resort So far, tbe conditions for ushg force against rrq art not fufiued: Wie suspicions sin, no evidence has b givm &at rag sti possasa wepm ction or capabiities in this fied; nspations have just rrached heir fu1 pace; they ue functioning without hin they have arcady productd ruuts; e not yet tuy satisfanory. hqi cochief inrpstors in their ast report. 2. The Seenrity Counci must step up its effoa to give a rea chance to the peactfu settemeot of the crisis. n thic conterf tbe foowuig conditions are of pnramount importance: the unity of the Security Counci must be presaved; the pressure tha! is put on Traq must be increased. \ 3. Tbese conditions caii be met, and our common objective - the veriiabe ditumme~t of rrq - ean be reaebcd through tbe impemkntstion of tbe foowing proposas: A) Ctar program of action for thc inspcctions: According to resoution 1284, have to submit their pro of work for approva of the Coun thi3 program of work sh e spctdcd up, in puticuu thc key rem tasics to be competed by raq pursuant to its obigations to compy with r requirements of resoution 687 (1 991) and otha reated resoutions. g aks sha be dehed accordiog to their degree of priority. of raq for impementation of each task be ccary debed uid pecise. Such a c$ew ida~fica~on of to be competed wi obigc raq to cooperate more aetivey. t wi aso provide a cear means for the Counci to assess the COoperation of raq.
FEB-24-2883 15: 47 MSSON 212 S188 P.83 Resoution 1441 estabished an intnisive and ossibiitics have not ytt bem expor oud incude, as exempified in th commwcated to the chief an expertise; estabishment gned in particu~ to d~eck 0x1 truck; competion of the n w system of auia sweimce; systematic processing of data provided by the newy estabished system of atria swei C) Timeines for inspections and assessment: ework of resoution 1284 and 1441, the impementation of the program, sequmced accordig to a reaistic and ngorous timeine: - the inspecton shoud bc asked to submit the pro of ~~ork outikg the key raq to accompish, incuding missies / deivery systems, chemica, bioogica weapons matnia and nucear weapons in the context - 4 the chief inspectors sha report to the Counci on impementation of the program of work on a reguar basis (every 3 weeks); report of UNMOVC and AEA asse ha be submitted by the inspectors 1 work according to nsoution 1284; the progress made in competing the s after the adoption of the program of - at any time, according to paragraph 11 of tion 1441, the executive Ch of UNMOVC,and the Director Genera of the &a report immediatey to Counci any interfrrence by raq with inspections activities as we as faiure by raq to campy with its dis ent obigations; - at any time, additiona meetings of the Secunty Counci coud be decidad, incuding at high eve. To render possibe ii peacefu soution inspections shoud be given tbe neccrsary time and resources. Howtver, they can not eontinue indermitey. raq must disarm. ts fu1 and aetive eooperation s ocecssary. Tbis must incude tbe provision of iu the sddiuona and spe~fie hformation on issues raised by the inspeetors as we ao compianee with their requests, ar expressed in pnrticunr in Mr. Bir' etter of Februrry 21" 2003. The rombination af a cear program o action, reinforced inspections, a ccar timeine and #e miitary buid-up providt a reaistic rneans to reunite the Security Counci and to exert marimum pressure on nq.
02/21/03 FR &7:13 FM 2128633922 OV C-NY r UNTED NATONS NATONS UNXES NATONS Et CA'fON AND D8VECLON STON United Nations, Rmm 53120, NCW York, New York 10017 Tebp)rone (212) 963-3a7; F~x (212) 963-3922 dk (212) 963-9192 con~1usions reached by the Vi VC to conduct a techni p of thc A Samoud 2 and'a Fatah rs, conitruction of a missie test-stand and have now address o for your in Accept, Exceency, the as... matter, a copy of whi& is sidcnt of the Security Counci. ces of my highest c His Exceency t of the Security Counci United Nations New York, New York
UNTED NATONS NATONS UNES The Executive Chai Re c: OVC /O3 21 F 2003 Exceency, X have the His Exceency, gratefu if p mud smit herewith a etter of today's date addressed to atch to.baghhd, cxfice* 3 w3ud be s of my highest consideration. x Hans BY, His Exceency Mr. Mo rsd A. Adouri Ambassador Extráord and Penipotenti ary resentative of raq to the United Nations New York, New + York
URTED NATONS NATONS UNES owc NATONS M United Nations, S-312O,NwYo~NwY& 10017 Tccphone (212) 963-3017; Fax (2 12) 963-3922 & (212) 963-9 192 Dcar Dr. A Sa'adi, our atest discussions in Baghdad on 9 and 10 F that a pane of inkrnati uct a tecmca asses stems. The assessment was aso to incude. thc bers associated with the promibed Badr-2000 stroyed under LMSCOM supervision, as we as-the under constnictim at tht A Liquid Engine Test Faciity. The pane, which met on 10 and 1 1 Febniary, c nomhmted by the Govrrnmmts of China, France, Gemany, gdom and the Unibcd States. The Russian expert attend. was aso advised W, in 1994, UNSCOM provided p& with backgr~~d mfo 's missie pro es and hfbstnicture. The pane formed raq that any increme Dr. Amir H. A-Sa'adi Advi sor Presidentia Office Baghdad, raq
UNTED N A T ~ ~ N S NATONS 'UNES Tht was ~1animous in its assessmcnt in. Thest ~cmc1usi0;~ wcre Cornmisqioners on 1 3 - February. A Samoud 2, which domot ca.&, to tk Security Counci that the two decared 2 missie system w m capabe of ex ere therefore prosmibed pursiiant to (1 99 1) and tht monitoririg pan adopted by resoution 7 15 (1 99 1). Accordingy, the Govemment o f Jraq shoud on d 2 missies and foows: r 2. Fue and oxidizer, where depoyed with A Samoud 2 missies;
-02/21/03 FR 17314 FM 2129633922 UNTED NATONS NAT-ONS UNES $ide of the expo in the proccss of bemg so c reguaton, gas gem or deveoped for cation of the SA-2 d 2 system, such as and air pressure rcgdators; and other guidance and contro1 items, such as. a at and so importcd d2 cct to iaunchers, tue designed pafforms of the vehiccs need not bc destroycd, but Y"U--iri.W-----, red; that be tagged 7. Those components specific to the A Samoud 2, which a n inwrporated M the ogistic vehices, such as f', oxidizer, and coniro vehices requ 033 of the A Samoud 2 missie force; components design4 for tb e pr d 2 missie; and 9. A software and documentation con e conc@on, research and devcopment tion and quaity contro1 reated to the A Samoud 2 missie pro
02/21/03 FR R14 FM 2129633822 OVC-m UNTED NATONS NAT0N.S UNES thai had becn deemed S The pane found tbat cmification of A Fatah missie data suppied by raq was required before the capabiity uf the missi& system coud be assissec: OVC wii request such cxificati#n....,... 2bhCS ' The.-pye aso assessid that the tructiti& woud be capabe of that O tb $A-2!..q -ed out by raq under éct k m a:varicty be destmyed, such as exposive ts shoud bc made so 2003. the destruction
02/21/03 FR R15 FM 2129633942 1.WOVC-NY a UNTED NATONS NATONS UNES Concusims from the nt ationa Pane of Missie Experts 10 to 11 Febmary 2003 A group of internationa missie experts h m 6 countnes, incuding China, and the U'ted States, johed es of raq's iquid proptan t the A Fatah. Specificay, 150 kiometres. began thc confixence by bing the two missie Nations, and. opmcnt, testing, production q d on was then empoyed by the pane of experts to uter modes; each capabe of Ababi 100 missie, the predecessor to the A3 Sarnoud.N Samoud 2 The A Samoud 2 is a iquid propeant missie b by the Soviet Union for use in the SA-2 antimistainer engine's operating parameters and perfonmm we, understood and documented. missie. The SA-2
QfL21/03 FR 1735 FM 2149633922 LrNOVC-NV UNTED NATONS NATONS UNES 2002 CAFCD. The fint variant, on ofthe missie s to depoy a system that Both versions of thc A S wmputer.modes. Cd that both versions are inh range imit as defined Uie A Samoud 2 w& det average kmge cacuated maxirnum range achi 2 wcre evauated using four independcnt decared by kiq, show s. This is consistent with the detmed by an achieving a range The four in fighi simuations the A Samoud 2 are capabe of cxceeding the 150-kiometre range imit. Moreover, it shoud be noted that the input parameters for the modes reied on
02/21/03 FR 17:15 FM: 2129833922 b UNTED NATONS- NATONS UNES information decared by raq, even when this i wedocumented information con A Fatab is a soid propeant rocket c of the CAFCD. The cm pages 817 to 821 dccared by raq, which stak that the AJ Fatah has fom as Em as 161 kiometres with a different co of experts recommends that ecaration. To this end, the internationa pane c efforts to verify the input Casting chamb motors. During the 1 production of the BA missie system under UNSC Resoution 687, these casting chambm wce destroyed under
02421/03 FR 17:16 FM 2128635922 ' a UNTED NATONS NATONS UNES! esenty casts the A Fatah and its othcr soid prope1 refurbished the ex-b one of them to b&ce a than 150 kiometres. For tion A Rafah Liquid Engine Test Stand of a new Liquid Usmt Test Stand at test stand presenty tped at stroyed undcr UN G supavision. The expert pane revimed the C stics of the new teststand. and concuded that it wi be capabe of testing iqid propeuant engh exhibiting a thmt of 15 tons &ex competion, with to 30 tons force coud be acco ed. (Note: tons of thrust). One cxpert aso noted that each O the test smd has afi es store 2.2 eubic meters of iquid fw or oxidizer. This is about 3 times,t used by the A Samoud 2 missie.
The Semity Gounci, PP : Recaing a its pnvious reevant resoutions, in pdcuar its rcsoutions 66 1 (1 of August 1990,678 (1 990) of 29 November 1990,686 (1991) of 2 March 199 1,687 (1991) of 3 Apri 1991,688 (1991) of 5 Apri 1991,707(1991) of S August 1991, 71 S(1991) of 1 1 Uctober 1991,986 (1995) of 14 Apri 1995,12 f1 1999 and 1441 (2002) of 8 Novembex 2002, and a the reevant o f PP2: Recaing that in its resoution 687(1991) the Counci decared that a ceaseh woud be based on acceptance by raq of the provisions of that resoution, incuding the obigations on Xraq containad therein, PP3 : Recding that i t. resoution 1441 (2002), wke acmowadging that raq has b- and remains in materiai breach of its obigations, afforded raq a fina oppe with its at obigations under reevant resoutions, PP4: Recaing that in its resoution 1441(2002) thc Counci decided that fase stakments or omissions in the decaration submitted by raq pursuant to that resoution and hiure by rq a! any time to compy with, and w~perate hiiy in the impementation of, hat resoution, woud constitute a frther materia bmh, -. PP5: Noting, in that context, that in its resoution 1441(2002), the Counci ded that it has repeatady warnd raq that it wi face serious consqucnces as a resut of its continued vioations of its obigations, PP6: Noting that raq has submitted a decaration puisuant to its resoution 144 (2002) containing fase statements and omissions and has faied to compy with, and c0-0 fuy in the impementaiion of, that resoution, PP7: RedErming the commitment of a Member States to the sovereignty and territoria integrity of raq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring states, PP8: Mindfu of its primary responsibiity under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of intamtiona peace and secuiity, PP9: Racognising the threat raq's noncompiance with Counci resoutions and proiferation of weapons of mass destmction And ong-range missies poses to internationa pwe and sechty, e PPO: Determined to securc hi1 compiance with its decisions and to restore internationa peace and security in the area, PP 1 : Acting under Chaptcr V of the Charter of thc UMted Nations, OP1 : Decides that raq has faied to take the fina opportunity afforda to it in resoution 1 44 (2002); OP2: Decides to remain seized of the matter. C